## 1NC – FW

### 1NC – FW – Info Reflexivity

#### Interpretation – affs must defend hypothetical enactment of a United States federal government policy that substantially increases prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector by at least expanding the scope of its core antitrust laws

#### Resolved means to enact a policy by law.

Words & Phrases 64. [Words and Phrases; 1964; Permanent Edition]

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or **determination by resolution or vote**; as ‘it was resolved **by the legislature**;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as **meaning “to establish by law”**.

#### The United States federal government is the national government in DC.

Black’s Law 4. [Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, June 1, 2004, pg.716]

Federal government. 1. A **national government** that exercises some degree of control over smaller political units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the right to participate in national politics matters – Also termed (in federal states) **central government**. 2. **the U.S. government** – Also **termed national government**. [Cases: United States -1 C.J.S. United States - - 2-3]

#### ‘Core antitrust laws’ means Sherman, Clayton, and FTC

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At the federal level, there are three core antitrust laws: (1) the Sherman Act, in which Section 1 outlaws "every contract, combination, or conspiracy in [unreasonable] restraint of trade," and Section 2 outlaws any "monopolization, attempted monopolization, or conspiracy or combination to monopolize";1 (2) the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices";2 and (3) Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers and acquisitions where the effect "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."3 Criminal violations of the Sherman Act carry a maximum penalty of a $100 million fine for corporations, and a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a $1 million fine for individuals. A prevailing plaintiff in a civil suit can recover treble damages and attorneys' fees. But federal law currently does not provide for civil penalties when the government brings an antitrust case, only injunctive relief.

#### That’s key to predictability -- only an interp grounded in relevant legal literature gives debaters the basis to prepare negatives and affirmatives guaranteed to clash. There are a few impacts –

#### First is competitive equity – without predictable preparation and a stable stasis point, there is an aff side bias that destroys the competitive nature of the activity and participation – equity is obviously an impact because debate is a game that is key to the aff – if not, just vote neg

#### Second is information reflexivity --

#### The process of debate around a predictable governmental plan best creates the conditions for informed learning and well-rounded information gathering through a holistic research approach – the impact is information reflexivity – issues of factual evidence are difficult to resolve and require informed processes and information vetting to counter problematic premises that result in material violence like the Iraq war – only a model of debate that encourages 2nd and 3rd level argument testing, considers unintended consequences, and promotes conditional and dynamic argumentation will foster well informed decisions and self-efficacy

Leek 16. [Danielle R. Leek, Johns Hopkins University Advanced Academic Programs instructor, Director of Academic Innovation and Distance Education at Bunker Hill Community College, former executive director of the communications center and professor of communications at Grand Valley State University, “Policy debate pedagogy: a complementary strategy for civic and political engagement through service-learning,” Communication Education, 65:4, 401-405]

In policy debate, students are asked to consider whether a particular course of action should be taken, generally by state institutions such as the United States federal government, or its respective branches, such as the Supreme Court or the Congress (Snider & Schnurer, 2002). A policy debate can involve any institutional actor or agent such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the United Nations, the International Criminal Court, and so on. Questions of policy can address broad global issues, such as “Should the United States federal government sign a new nuclear treaty with Iran?” Or they might consider narrow rules for legal action, such as“Should the Michigan Department of Treasury require individuals to pay taxes online?” When connected to a service-learning experience, educators might set aside time for students to debate a relevant policy question. Using previous examples, students working on the health campaign might also be asked to debate the question, “Should the City of Grand Rapids provide mobile health clinics in the downtown area?” Chemistry students could debate, “Should the federal government require a universal science curriculum in all high schools?” No matter the topic, students should have the opportunity to engage multiple perspectives on the question, including speaking on the affirmative to support a new policy and on the negative in opposition to a change in the status quo. Students may be asked to work with one or more partners to research and develop materials that can be used in their speeches or in question-and-answer periods related to their arguments.

Especially for readers familiar with extracurricular policy debate competitions in high schools or college, this depiction of what policy debate entails may seem overly simplistic. Yet, even basic consideration of policy issues related to a service-learning experience can improve a student’s odds of political learning. Through policy debate, students can develop information literacy and learn how to make critical arguments of fact. This experience is politically empowering for students who will also build confidence for political engagement.

Information literacy

While there are many definitions of information literacy, the term generally is understood to mean that a student is “able to recognize when information is needed, and have the ability to locate, evaluate, and use effectively the information needed” for problem-solving and decision-making (Spitzer, Eisenberg, & Lowe, 1998, p. 19). Information exists in a variety of forms, in visual data, computer graphics, sound-recordings, film, and photographs. Information is also constructed and disseminated through a wide range of sources and mediums. Therefore, “information literacy” functions as a blanket term which covers a wide range of more specific literacies. Critiques of service-learning’s knowledge-building power, such as those articulated by Eby (1998) and Colby (2008), are challenging both the emphasis the pedagogy places on information gained through experience and the limited scope of political information students are exposed to in the process.

Policy debate can augment a student’s civic and political learning by fostering extended information literacies. Snider and Schnurer (2002) identify policy debate as an especially research intensive form of oral discussion which requires extensive time and commitment to learn the dimensions of a topic. Understanding policy issues calls for contemplating a range of materials, from traditional news media publications to court proceedings, research data, and institutional propaganda. Moreover, the nature of policy debate, which involves public presentation of arguments on two competing sides of a question, motivates students to go beyond basic information to achieve a more advanced level of expertise and credibility on a topic (Dybvig & Iverson, n.d.). This type of work differs from traditional research projects where students gather only the materials needed to support their argument while neglecting contrary evidence. Instead, the “debate research process encourages a kind of holistic approach, where students need to pay attention to the critics of their argument because they will have to respond to those attacks” (Snider & Schnurer, 2002, p. 32). In today’s attention economy, cultivating a sensibility for well-rounded information gathering can also aid students in recognizing when and how the knowledge produced in their social environments can be effectively translated to specific contexts. The “cultural shift in the production of data” which has followed the emergence of Web 2.0 technologies means that all students are likely “prosumers”—that is, they consume, produce, and coproduce information online all at the same time (Scoble, 2011).

Coupling service- learning with policy debate calls on students to apply information across registers of public engagement, including their own service efforts and their own public argumentation, in and outside of their debates. Information is used in the service experience, which in turn, informs the use of information in debates, where students then produce new information through their argumentation. The process is what Bruce (2008) refers to “informed learning,” or “using information in order to learn.” When individuals move from learning how to gather materials for a task to a cognitive awareness and understanding of how the information-seeking process shapes their learning, they are engaged in informed learning. Through this process, students can come to recognize that information management and credibility is deeply disciplinary and historically contextual (Bruce & Hughes, 2010). This understanding, combined with practical experience in locating information, is a critical missing element in contemporary political engagement. Over 20 years ago, Graber (1994) argued that one of the biggest obstacles to political engagement was not apathy, but a gap between the way news media presents information during elections, and the type of information voters need and will listen to during electoral campaigns. The challenge extends beyond elections into policy-making, especially as younger generations continue to revise their notions of citizenship away from institutional politics towards more social forms of activism (Bennett, Wells, & Freelon, 2011). For students to effectively practice more expressive forms of citizenship they need experience managing the breadth of information available about issues they care about. As past research indicates a strong correlation between service-learning experience and the motivation and desire for post-graduation service, it seems likely that students who debate about policy issues related to service areas will continue their informed learning practices after they have left the classroom (Soria & Thomas-Card, 2014).

Arguing facts

In addition to building information literacies, students who combine policy debate with service-learning can practice “politically relevant skills,” which will help them have confidence for political engagement in the future. As Colby (2008) explains, this confidence should be tempered by tolerance for difference and differing opinions. On the surface, debating about institutional politics might seem counterintuitive to this goal. Politicians and the press have a credibility problem among college-aged students, and this leaves younger generations less inclined to feel obligated to the state or to look to traditional modes of policymaking for social change (Bennett et al., 2011; Manning & Edwards, 2014). This lack of faith in government and media outlets also makes political argument more difficult (Klumpp, 2006). Whereas these institutions once served as authoritative and trustworthy sources of information, the credibility of legislators and journalists has decreased over the last 40 years or so. Today, politicians and pundits are viewed as political actors interested in spectacle, power, and profit rather than truth-seeking or the common good.

While some political controversies are rooted in competing values, Klumpp (2006) explains that arguments about policy are more often based in fact. Indeed, when engaged in public arguments over questions of policy, people tend to “invoke the authority of facts to support their positions.” Likewise, “the governmental sphere has developed elaborate legal and deliberative processes in recognition of the power of facts as the basis for a decision.” Yet, while shared values are often quickly agreed upon, differences over fact are more difficult to resolve. Without credible institutions of authority that can disseminate facts, public deliberation requires more time, information-gathering, evaluation, and reasoning. The Bush administration’s decision to take military action in Iraq, for example, was presumably based on the “fact” that Saddam Hussein had acquired weapons of mass destruction. This has now become a classic example of poor policy-making grounded in faulty factual evidence.

This shortcoming is precisely why policy debate is a valuable complement to servicelearning activities. Not only can students use their developing literacies to better understand social problems, they can also learn to access a broader range of knowledge sources, thereby mitigating the absence of fact-finding from traditional institutions. Furthermore, policy advocacy gives students experience testing the reasoning underlying claims of fact. Issues of source credibility, analogic comparisons, and data analysis are three examples of the type of critical thinking skills that students may need to apply in order to engage a question of policy (Allen, Berkowitz, Hunt, & Louden, 1999). While the effect may be to undermine government action in some instances, in others students will gain a better understanding of when and where institutional activities can work to make change. As students gain knowledge about the relationship between institutional structures and the communities they serve, they grow confidence in their ability to engage in future conversations about policy issues. Zwarensteyn’s (2012) research highlights these sorts of effects in high school students who engage in competitive policy debate. Zwarensteyn theorizes that even minimal increases in technical knowledge about politics can translate to significant increases in a student’s sense of self-efficacy. Many students start off feeling very insecure when it comes to their mastery of institutional politics; policy debate helps overcome that insecurity. Moreover, because training in policy debate encourages students to address issues as arguments rather than partisan positions, it encourages them to engage policy-making without the hostility and incivility that often characterizes today’s political scene. Indeed, it is precisely that perceived hostility and incivility that prompts many young people to avoid politics in the first place.

I do not mean to imply that students who debate about their service-learning experiences will draw homogenous conclusions about policies. Quite the contrary. Students who engage in service-learning still bring their personal visions and history to bear on their debates. As a result, students will often have very different opinions after engaging in a shared debate experience. More importantly, the practice of debating should operate to particularize students’ knowledge of community partners and clients, working against the destructive generalizations and power dynamics that can result when students feel privileged to serve less fortunate “others.” For civic and political engagement through service-learning to be meaningful and productive, it must do more to challenge students’ concepts of the homogenous “we” who helps “them.” Seligman (2013) argues that this civic spirit can be cultivated through the core pedagogical principle of a “shared practice,” which emphasizes the application of knowledge to purpose (p. 60). Policy debate achieves this outcome by calling on students to consider and reconsider their understanding of themselves, institutions, community, and policy every time the question “should” may arise. As Seligman writes:

… the orientation of thought to purpose (having an explanation rest at a place, a purpose) is of extreme importance. We must recognize that the orientation of thought to purpose is to recognize moving from providing a knowledge of, to providing a knowledge for. This means that in the context of encountering difference it is not sufficient to learn about (have an idea of) the other, rather it means to have ideas for certain joint purposes—for a set of “to-does.” A purpose becomes the goal towards which our explanations should be oriented. (p. 61)

Put another way, policy debate challenges students “to maintain a sense of doubt and to carry on a systematic and protracted inquiry” in the process of service-learning itself (Seligman, 2013, p. 60). This is precisely the type of complex, ongoing, reflective inquiry that John Dewey had in mind.

Political engagement through policy debate

This essay began with a discussion of the growing attention to civic engagement programs in higher education. The national trend is to accomplish higher levels of student civic responsibility during and after their time in college through service-learning experiences tied to curricular learning objectives. A challenge for service-learning scholars and teachers is to recognize a distinction between civic activities that are accomplished by helping others and political activities that require engagement with the collective institutional structures and processes that govern social life. Both are necessary for democracy to thrive. Policy debate pedagogy can help service-learning educators accomplish these dual objectives.

To call policy debate a pedagogy rather than just a style of debate is purposeful. A pedagogy is a praxis for cultivating learning in others. The pedagogy of service-learning helps students to know and engage social conditions through physical engagement with their environments and communities. Policy debate pedagogy leads students to know and engage these same social conditions while also challenging them to apply their knowledge for the purpose of political advocacy. These pedagogies are natural compliments for cultivating student learning. Therefore, future studies should explore how well service-learning combined with policy debate can resolve concerns that policy debate alone does not go far enough to invest students with political agency (Mitchell, 1998). The present analysis suggests the potential for such an outcome is likely.

Moreover, research is clear that the civic effects of service-learning as an instructional method are improved simply by increasing the amount of time spent on in-class discussion about the service work students do (Levesque-Bristol, Knapp, & Fisher, 2010). Policy debates related to students’ service can accomplish this goal and more. Policy debates can also facilitate the political learning students need to build their political efficacy and capacity for political engagement. Through informed learning about the political process—especially in the context of service practice—students develop literacies that will extend beyond the classroom. Using this knowledge in reasoned public argument about policy challenges invites students to move beyond cynical disengagement towards a productive recognition of their own potential voice in the political world.

Policy debate pedagogy brings unique elements to the process of political learning. By emphasizing the conditional and dynamic nature of political arguments and processes, debates can work to relieve students of the misconception that there is a single “right answer” for questions about policy-making and politics, especially during election time. The communication perspective on policy debates also highlights students’ collective involvement in the ever-changing field of political terms, symbols, and meanings that constitute interpretations of our social world. In fact, the historical roots of the term “communication” seem to demand that speech and debate educators call for such emphasis on political learning. “To make common,” the Latin interpretation of communicare, situates our discipline as the heart of public political affairs (Peters, 1999). Connecting policy debate to service-learning helps highlight the common purpose of these approaches in efforts to promote civic engagement in higher education.

#### You should also filter their impacts through predictable testability and model comparison -- debate inherently judges relative truth value by whether or not it gets answered -- a combination of a less predictable case neg, the burden of rejoinder, and them starting a speech ahead will always inflate the value of their impacts, which makes non-arbitrarily weighing whether they should have read the 1ac in the first place impossible within the structure of a debate round so even if we lose framework, vote neg on presumption. They also create a moral hazard that leads to affs only about truth claims so even if you think this aff is answerable, the ones they incentivize are not, so assume the least-answerable affirmative when weighing our impacts.

#### Second is deliberative reasoning –switching sides creates the best conditions for adequate deliberation, the impact is deliberative reasoning – only thoroughly vetting issues on both sides, developing arguments for and against actions, and actively seeking and engaging well-developed, prepared counterarguments solves

**Manin 5** [Bernard Manin, New York University Professor of Politics. “Deliberation: Why We Should Focus on Debate Rather Than Discussion.” 10/13/05. <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/253156537_Deliberation_why_we_should_focus_on_debate_rather_than_discussion>]

The absence of polarization suggests that we take a closer look at the particular setting of the event. Fishkin’s formula is as follows: “Select a national probability sample of the citizen voting age population and question them about some policy domain(s). Send them balanced, accessible briefing materials to help inform them and get them thinking more seriously about the same subject(s). Transport them to a single site, where they can spend several days grappling with the issues, discussing them with one another in randomly assigned, moderated small groups and putting questions generated by the small group discussions to carefully balanced panels of policy experts and political leaders. At the end, question the participants again, using the same questionnaire as at the beginning.” (Luskin et al. 2002: 458.Emphasis mine) 6

Such a setting differs in a number of ways from the experimental settings in which group polarization is observed. From among such differences, Fishkin himself stresses the following:

- Anticipation of the event. People are selected some time before the event. In the meantime they begin paying more attention to the issue.

- Participants receive a “carefully balanced booklet laying out the main proposals being discussed by political leaders and the arguments being made for and against them. “ Fishkin also notes that: “By contrast information materials consumed under natural conditions are generally skewed by selective exposure.” (Luskin et al. 2002: 459. Emphasis mine).

- The random assignment to small discussion groups, following on random sampling for recruitment of participants, means that the “discussions feature a far wider variety of perspectives than most participants are likely to encounter in real life.” (Luskin et al. 2002: ibid).

- Lastly, “the opportunity to hear and question balanced panels of policy experts and politicians. Yet again the balance is important. It is much harder than in real life to “tune out’ Tories, Labour supporters or others with whom one expects to disagree.”(Luskin et al. 2002: 460. Emphasis mine)

The question then is: which of these differences in the setting accounts for the absence of a polarization phenomenon? Fishkin plans to disaggregate the effects of the various components of his deliberative poll. To my knowledge, he has not done so yet. The empirical answer is not available.

In a study of a “citizens’ jury” that took place in Australia in 2000, the authors note: “Analysis of the deliberations of a citizens’ jury on an Australian environmental issue shows jurors’ attitudes changing more in response to the ‘information’ phase of the jury proceedings, involving a large degree of ‘deliberation within’, than during the formal ‘discussion’ phase.” (Goodin and Niemeyer. 2003). The setting here was again different from that of the deliberative poll. The authors did not focus on the polarization phenomenon either. However, it is worth noting that disaggregating the effects of the various ingredients in these deliberative practices may yield important and unexpected results. Goodin’s findings should certainly alert us to the possibility that discussion in the strict sense of interactive engagement among participants might not be the most consequential component of such experiments in deliberation.

2. DIVERSITY IS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR ADEQUATE DELIBERATION

While we do not have yet conclusive empirical evidence in this matter, one element of these experiments in deliberation deserves particular attention: the presence of diverse and conflicting views among deliberators. A long tradition of liberal theorists praising the virtues of discussion have emphasized that a necessary and sufficient condition for those virtues to materialize is that participants in discussion hold diverse views and articulate a variety of perspectives, reflecting the heterogeneity of their experiences and backgrounds. That tradition ranges, to mention just a few names, from Mill, to Popper, to Sunstein, Sunstein for example, regards the choice by the American Constituents to establish a republican government in a heterogeneous country as “the Framers’ greatest contribution”. (Sunstein, 2003).

The problem with that line of thinking is that “diversity of views” and “conflicting views” get treated as roughly interchangeable notions. It is my contention that these notions are not interchangeable. Further, I shall claim that diversity of perspectives within an assembly or a larger body does not necessarily secure adequate deliberation.

I can see three main reasons why diversity of views is not a sufficient condition for good deliberation.

II.1. Converging reasons. Suppose an assembly composed of members of diverse backgrounds, experiences, training etc. Suppose further that the fear of some danger is widespread among members. That fear may not be irrational or unfounded. Let us imagine, for instance, that a serial killer is still at large or that a wave of high profile bombings has occurred. In any case suppose that members all share one objective; they all wish to achieve better security. Suppose now that a measure objectively enhancing security is proposed: say, giving new powers to the police. My claim is that under such circumstances few if any, arguments pointing to the potential downsides of that measure will be heard, in spite of the diversity of perspectives within the assembly. The pool of arguments will, then, be skewed. The mechanisms accounting for this outcome are as follows:

II.1.1. Costs of information search. Members will apply the “satisficing” principle. They will use the following guidelines. “Go no further than the good argument for giving new powers to the police. Stop the costly search for information once a good reason has been advanced in favor of a given course of action. “

II.1.2. The variety of perspectives and dispersion of social knowledge among them ensure that many arguments, each deriving from the particular perspective, experience, or background of the speaker, will be heard in support of expanding the prerogatives to the police. The set of arguments will be lopsided. In the discussion members will be piling reason upon reason to broaden the powers to the police.

II.1.3. Reluctance to search for the potential downsides of the measure, and to articulate them, for fear of being seen as an opponent of a measure objectively promoting the common goal. Note that this is not the same as sheer conformity. This is not just thinking what others think, but thinking what they think with a good reason.

II.1.4. Reluctance to undermine the adoption of the measure that objectively promotes the common goal. And yet, giving new powers to the police might have some downsides, too. If a body deliberates about the measure, it surely wants to explore whether any such downsides exist in order to weigh them against the good reasons for adopting the measure.

II.2. Confirmatory bias. There is a second reason why mere diversity of views and arguments may fail to bring about adequate deliberation. Suppose now an assembly or a larger body in which a belief or a view is prevailing at a given point. This belief or view bears on the decision to be made. In a diverse body or assembly, there are probably a number of other beliefs, each supported by argument and evidence. We would then hope, in Millian fashion, that those holding the dominant belief will give due consideration and weight to the arguments advanced by the holders of other views. However, that will probably not happen.

Social and cognitive psychologists tell us that people holding a given belief tend to interpret new information brought before them as confirming their prior belief. People do not process information in a neutral and unbiased manner. Submit the same documentary materials about the death penalty and its putative deterrent effects to two groups of subjects, one relatively favorable to the death penalty, the other mildly opposed to it, the former group will become more favorable to the death penalty, the other will become more strongly opposed to it (Lord et al. 1979). People, it turns out, systematically misperceive and misinterpret evidence that is counter to their preexisting belief. There is nothing irrational in taking prior beliefs as a starting point for interpreting new evidence. What is noteworthy, and not rational, is that people tend to misread evidence as additional support for their initial hypotheses. Such a phenomenon is known as confirmatory bias. It has been corroborated by a number of experiments.8

A subsequent experiment showed that the most effective way of countering the effects of the confirmatory bias was to give greater salience to the information that ran counter to the subjects’ priori belief (for instance, by casting into brighter light visual pieces of conflicting information). Such a strategy proved more effective in countering the confirmatory bias than instructing the subjects to give fair consideration to conflicting information (Lord et al. 1984).

Furthermore, a number of studies suggest that group settings and discussion accentuate the impact of the confirmatory bias. Groups process information in a more biased way than individuals do, preferring information that supports their prior dominant belief to an even greater extent than individual people (Schultz-Hardt et al. 2000). This in turn results from two mechanisms. First, as already noted, groups accentuate dominant tendencies among their members. If we consider the preference for supporting information a dominant bias, we should not be surprised to find that group settings accentuate this bias. There is also, however, a second mechanism at work that should particularly concern us. A body of research has revealed that groups mainly discuss and make use of information that was available to all group members before the start of the discussion. People primarily discuss “shared information”. They partly fail in gathering and discussing information that was accessible to only one or a few members before the discussion. Shared information seems more valid and stands a better chance of being mentioned, and therefore remembered, during group discussion than unshared information (Stasser and Titus, 1985; Gigone and Hastie, 1993; Stewart and Stasser, 1998). Further, information conforming to the group’s preferred alternative is more likely to enter the discussion than information opposing this alternative (Stasser and Titus, 1985; 1470). If this is so, group discussion will generate a disproportionate amount of information and arguments reinforcing the already prevailing belief.9 When we advocate deliberation, we certainly do not expect it to reinforce the pre-existing dominant belief, whatever it happened to be.

Returning, then, to our hypothetical assembly, if we wished to keep in check the force of the confirmatory bias, to which groups are particularly susceptible, we should take deliberate and affirmative measures, not just let diverse voices be heard. Conflicting arguments do not automatically get a fair hearing.

3. Balkanisation. Lastly, in a context broader than an assembly, mere diversity or heterogeneity may very well result into the self-selection of enclaves of likeminded people. In that case, conflicting views will not come into contact with each other. A variety of internally homogeneous communities will coexist, each ignoring the views of the others.

In praising critical discussion, Popper once wrote:

“[…] the discussion will be the more fruitful the more the partners’ background differ. Thus the value of a discussion depends largely upon the variety of the competing views. Had there been no Tower of Babel, we should invent it.” (Popper 1989: 352)

Leaving aside the deliberately hyperbolic element in this reference, it is odd that Popper should have interpreted in this way the episode in Genesis. After God destroyed their common language, the inhabitants of the city did not take advantage of their language-based diverse perspectives, criticizing each other and thereby improving their construction skills, they just left off building, presumably talking only to their own kin.

Be it as it may, heterogeneity in a large population does not automatically lead to communication across lines of difference. There is every reason to be concerned about this today. Research suggests that cross-cutting communication and exposure to opposing political views have declined in the U.S. over the last decades. The kind of people with whom any given individual discusses public matters is first a function of the availability of discussion partners in one’s immediate environment. Residential segregation now operates primarily to produce greater homogeneity in interpersonal relations. Residential patterns suggest increasingly spatially segregated living, even within the heterogeneous populations of large cities. Heterogeneity may lead to balkanization, not to interaction with dissimilar people. A number of studies have documented, and deplored, the fact that Americans are increasingly separated from those with political views different from their own (Calhoun, 1988; Harrison and Bennett 1995; Frey 1995; Mutz and Martin 2001).

Residential segregation is not, however, the sole factor in the emergence of such a landscape characterized by diversity cum homogeneity. Sociologists and psychologists have long noted that people exercise selectivity in the views they expose themselves to. Many studies in media research have explored the phenomenon known as “selective exposure” (i.e. the propensity to expose oneself selectively to media messages consonant with one’s own views). After decades of research media scholars came to the conclusion that selective exposure was not, on close analysis, well corroborated. However, the phenomenon seems well established in the domain of interpersonal interactions; people tend to select politically like-minded discussion partners (Frey 1986; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). The mechanism accounting for this is pretty straightforward: encountering disagreement in face-to-face interactions generates psychic discomfort. Here casual introspection may add some vividness to scientific findings.

If selectivity is less prevalent and robust in the domain of media exposure than in personal interactions, we could perhaps place hopes in the media, as Mutz and Martin (2002) do. Indeed these authors find that individuals are exposed to far more dissimilar political views via news media than through interpersonal political discussions. However, another recent trend keeps us from overestimating the potential of the media: the trend towards highly specialized rather than mass channels (Turow 1997). This trend is sometimes referred to as: “narrowcasting”. We could say, borrowing the formulation from E. Katz, the media scholar; “And deliver us from segmentation” (Katz 1996).

Lastly, Internet news sources and specialized websites offer an increasing potential for tailoring news to one’s own views, and for forming communities of likeminded people in a wider context of diversity.

Thus, diversity and heterogeneity do not necessarily lead to communication across lines of difference. When we advocate deliberation, we have in mind something other than the conversations of like-minded people, reinforcing their prior beliefs, and insulated from opposing views. Let us return, then to the concept of deliberation.

3. ADEQUATE DELIBERATION REQUIRES CONSIDERATION OF REASONS FOR AND AGAINST COURSES OF ACTION

Consider three definitions of deliberation. Not that definitions count as arguments, but because the following definitions may point to solution of our problem. At any rate the following definitions highlight a characteristic of deliberation that goes beyond the mere articulation of reasons or arguments in support of actions to be taken.

“Deliberation [sumbouleuein] consists in arguing for or against something [to men protropè to dè apotropè].” (Aristotle, Rhetoric, I, 2,) Deliberation: 1. “The action of deliberating, or weighing a thing in the mind; careful consideration with a view to decision”. 2. “The consideration and discussion of the reasons for and against a measure by a number of councilors (e.g. in a legislative assembly)” (Oxford English Dictionary)

“Deliberation is nothing else but a weighing, as it were in scales, the conveniencies, and inconveniencies of the fact we are attempting.” (Hobbes, De Cive, XIII, 16)

Note that these definitions cover both deliberation within the individual mind, as in definition 1 from the O.E.D., and collective deliberation, as in Aristotle and in definition 2 from the O.E.D. However, the O.E.D. supplies the citation from the De Cive under definition 1. Whether individual or collective, then, deliberation would seem to imply consideration of reasons for as well as reasons against a given course of action.

Indeed we say that we deliberate, whether individually or collectively, when we engage in a distinctive mode of mental activity, more specifically in a distinctive mode of reasoning. We deliberate about a given course of action when we suspect that there might be reasons against it as well as reasons for it. If we did not think that there might be, at least potentially, reasons for not doing X alongside reasons for doing it, we would use reason in a different way. We would seek to prove, or at least to establish, that X is the right course of action by supplying solid argument(s) for it. We would not actively seek counterarguments. It is the seeking and the weighing of pros and cons that distinguishes deliberation from other forms of reasoning.

Such a distinction is not merely a matter of semantics. We observe that under some circumstances we actually engage in a kind of reasoning that involves such seeking and weighing of pros and cons. We do not always reason in this way. Whatever name we wish to give to this mode, we can hardly deny that it exists, and that it is distinct from other forms of reasoning.

The first distinctive trait of this mode of reasoning, –which we usually denote as “deliberation”–, consists in its bifurcated character. We do not use such bifurcated reasoning when we search for the solution to a mathematical set; then we do not seek counter arguments or counter-solutions. The second distinctive trait is the one that the metaphor of “weighing as in scales” tries to capture. One could say that economic, or utilitarian, reasoning, too operates in a bifurcated way by searching for the costs and benefits of actions. However, the cost and benefits analysis differs from “weighing” considerations. In a cost and benefits analysis, we do not need actually to “weigh” the two sides of the equation. These are already weighed for us by the common metric in which they are measured. Once we have identified the costs and benefits, all we need to do is to compute them. Again it seems hard to deny that there exists a distinctive kind of mental activity, one that we usually denote as the weighing of reasons, which differs from computing already given weights.

So much, then, for the descriptive analysis of that peculiar mode of thinking that we commonly term “deliberation”. What about its value? If there are actions such as reasons for and against them might exist, then it seems obvious that we will do better by considering both sides of any such action. Note in particular that we will do better by considering reasons for and against each of the contemplated alternatives than by considering reasons for each of the alternatives.

Think of the following situation: a given country is affected by widespread unemployment. Two policies are proposed: establishing training programs for the unemployed, and creating jobs in the public sector. By hearing reasons for either of the alternatives participants in deliberation may not learn anything about the downsides of the other. This is because these two policies are alternatives by virtue of some extrinsic factor (the budget constraint).

Diversity of views is not a sufficient condition for deliberation because it may fail to bring into contact opposing views. It is the opposition of views and reasons that is necessary for deliberation, not just their diversity.

Note that the epistemic merits of deliberation operate along lines different from those of the classical information pooling mechanism, as mentioned by Aristotle and Condorcet.

“This is the reason why the many are better judges of music and the writings of poets; some appreciate one part, some another; and all together appreciate all” (Aristotle, Politics, III, 11).

The mechanism driving the Condorcet Jury Theorem is roughly of the same kind: pooling individual probabilities of finding the truth. The epistemic value of deliberation rests on an entirely different mechanism. It should be noted that in his famous argument about the wisdom of the many, Aristotle does not employ the notion of deliberation (sumbouleuein). In fact, when we collectively deliberate, advancing arguments for or against a given action, we are likely to suppress some of the information we have. We suppress the part that is not in line with our position in the discussion. After reviewing and weighing for ourselves the reasons for and against a given action, we come to a conclusion. We then take a position. However, when we speak in public in the course of deliberation, we share only the part of information that supports our position. Suffice it to mention the experience of deliberation in recruitment committees.

The epistemic merit of collective deliberation rests on mutual criticism. This is a further reason for giving pride of place to pros and cons in a sound conception of deliberation.

Athenian democrats might have sensed that diversity of voices was not sufficient in cases where adequate deliberation was advisable. Consider the institution of graphè para nomon. This institution amounted to a second hearing for some decrees passed by the Assembly. This second hearing, which was intended to be more thorough and thoughtful than the first one differed in many ways from the proceedings of the Ekklèsia. One such difference was that before the People’s Court the procedure was necessarily adversarial, with one side speaking for the decree and the other side against it. The key point, however, is that the adversarial procedure could not possibly be based on considerations of fairness. Plaintiff and defendant were legal fictions. The plaintiff did not claim that he had suffered any damage at the hands of the defendant. In the absence of considerations of fairness, we may conjecture that the adversarial proceedings were required during that second hearing on grounds of their superior epistemic merits.

To be sure, when Mill extolled the merits of discussion, he had in mind critical discussion. He praised conflicting arguments, the articulation of pros and cons, and the “hearing of both sides” in innumerable passages. However, he mentioned diversity of opinion and conflicting views almost interchangeably, as if the former necessarily implied the latter. He did not think that the articulation of pros and cons needed deliberate encouragement. Nor did he propose any arrangement aiming to bring into contact diverse self-selected groups of like-minded people. Still less did he offer advice on how to counter people’s propensity to find confirmation of their existing beliefs. In a diverse society, he thought, conflicting opinions would spontaneously arise. They would confront each other, if only given a chance. This is why he famously wrote:

The most intolerant of churches, the Roman Catholic Church, even at a canonization of a saint, admits, and patiently listens to a ‘devil’s advocate’. (Emphasis mine) However, such an interpretation of the role of the advocatus diaboli is surely a mistake: the presence of a devil’s advocate is required precisely because no one may spontaneously take the other side.

4. CONCLUSIONS; FOCUSING ON PUBLIC DEBATE RATHER THAN CONVERSATION

In light of the foregoing analysis, I would make a case for the following propositions:

\* As theorists of deliberation, we should shift our attention from the “conversation model” of deliberation to the “oratory model”. (Remer 2000). We need to retrieve and study a long tradition of theorizing going from Aristotle, to Cicero, to Quintilian, to Perelman, -the theorist who most recently rejuvenated that tradition. The conversation model has enjoyed undue prominence over the last decade. To borrow a formula from M. Schudson, I would say: “Conversation is not the soul of democracy” (Schudson 1997)

\* On a practical level, adversarial debates on issues of public concern need to be actively promoted, as one cannot expect them to arise spontaneously in a diverse society with freedom of speech. Note that the two dimensions –the adversarial character, and the focus on common issues– need active promoting.

\* Such debates would not serve as substitutes for interactive discussion, but as a supplement to it, indeed as a stimulation and prelude to discussion.

\* Debate format –in which speakers address an audience that merely listens to them– is a more promising set-up for exposure to conflicting positions than interactive personal engagement amongst holders of opposing views, as people tend to avoid face-to-face disagreement.

\* Citizens’ organizations, foundations, debating societies or other voluntary groups should organize these debates. Such voluntary groups would gradually establish their civic reputation and commitment to public interest. In any event, these debates should be left to private –although not for profit– initiative. In that way we would not face the problems that proved fatal to the “fairness doctrine”: inextricable litigation over what counted as an opposing view and failure of the F.C.C. to provide a consistent doctrine on the matter (Simmons 1978). In this, I disagree with Sunstein (2001).

\* One could raise the following objection: Exposure to conflicting views cannot be mandated therefore organizing such debates is futile. To which I would respond: from the fact that such exposure cannot be mandated, it does not follow that it is pointless to facilitate it. Availability of contact with conflicting views matters, as we mentioned earlier (Mutz 2001).

\* Who should be the speakers? People who advocate a given policy or position for its own merits, not for reasons extrinsic to that policy. Speakers may advocate a policy that favors their interest, but on the condition that such interest is inherent in that policy, and not deriving from extrinsic connections, such as career advancement, or promotion of objectives unrelated to the policy in question. This might be termed the principle of “relevant interest”. A complete disconnection from irrelevant interests –i.e. interests not related to the substance of the advocated policy– is probably hard to achieve. The guiding principle stands, however: the disconnection from irrelevant interests should be maximized. One key implication of this is: the jobs and careers of speakers should not be on the line in such debates.

## 1NC – DA

### 1NC – Heg DA

The aff stands in opposition to US hegemonic power and state sovereignty – that’s bad

#### Decline causes unstable nuclear alliances that cause nuclear war – states cling to hegemony but the lack of clear rules causes prolif – extinction outweighs its irreversible and makes aff solvency impossible

Hayes 18 [Peter Hayes, Nautilus Institute, Berkeley, California, USA; Center for International Security Studies, Sydney University. Trump and the Interregnum of American Nuclear Hegemony. November 8, 2018. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2018.1532525>]

During a post-hegemonic era, long-standing nuclear alliances are likely to be replaced by ad hoc nuclear coalitions, aligning and realigning around different congeries of threat and even actual nuclear wars, with much higher levels of uncertainty and unpredictability than was the case in the nuclear hegemonic system.

There are a number of ways that this dynamic could play out during the interregnum, and these dynamics are likely to be inconsistent and contradictory. In some instances, the sheer momentum of past policy combined with bureaucratic inertia and the potency of political, military service and corporate interests, may ensure that residual aspects of the formerly hegemonic postures are adhered to even as formal nuclear alliances rupture. Even as they reach for the old anchors, these states may be forced to adjust and retrench strategically, or start to take their own nuclear risks by making increasingly explicit nuclear threats and deployments against nuclear-armed adversaries – as Japan has begun to do with reference to its “technological deterrent” since about 2012.9 This period could last for many years until and when nuclear war breaks out and leads to a post-nuclear war disorder; or a new, post-hegemonic strategic framework is established to manage and/or abolish nuclear threat.

Under full-blown American nuclear hegemony, fewer states had nuclear weapons, the major nuclear weapons states entered into legally binding restraints on force levels and they learned from nuclear near-misses to promulgate rules of the road and tacit understandings. The lines drawn during full-blown collisions involving nuclear weapons were stark and concentrated the minds of leaders greatly. In a nuclear duel, it was clear that only one of two sides could fire first; the only question was which one. Now, with nine nuclear weapons states, and conflicts conceivably involving three, four or more of them, no matter how much leaders concentrate, it will not be evident who is aiming at who, who may fire first, and during a volley, who fired first and even who hit whom.

In a highly proliferated world, nuclear-armed states may feel driven to obtain larger nuclear forces able to deter multiple adversaries at the same time, sufficient to conduct not only a few nuclear attacks but configured to fight more than one protracted nuclear war at a time, especially in nuclear states torn apart by civil war and post-nuclear attack reconstruction. The first time nuclear weapons are used since 1945 will be shocking, the second time, less so, the third time, the new normal.

#### No offense - the era of liberalist interventionism is over in favor of realism

Posner 9/3 [Eric, professor at the University of Chicago Law School. “America's Return to Realism”. 9/3/21. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/america-return-to-foreign-policy-realism-by-eric-posner-2021-09]

CHICAGO – US President Joe Biden’s speech defending the withdrawal from Afghanistan announced a decisive break with a tradition of foreign-policy idealism that began with Woodrow Wilson and reached its apex in the 1990s. While that tradition has often been called “liberal internationalism,” it also was the dominant view on the right by the end of the Cold War. The United States, according to liberal internationalists, should use military force as well as its economic power to compel other countries to embrace liberal democracy and uphold human rights.

Both in conception and in practice, American idealism rejected the Westphalian international system, in which states are forbidden to intervene in others’ internal affairs, and peace results from maintaining a balance of power. Wilson sought to replace this system with universal principles of justice, administered by international institutions. During World War II, Franklin D. Roosevelt revived these ideals in the Atlantic Charter of 1941, which declared self-determination, democracy, and human rights to be war goals.

But during the Cold War, the US pursued a resolutely “realist” foreign policy that focused on national interest and propped up or tolerated dictatorships as long as they opposed the Soviet Union. The two rivals had little use for international institutions or universal ideals except for propaganda purposes, instead using regional arrangements to knit together their allies. It was Europe that, in the 1970s, tried to advance human rights and assume a position of moral leadership to distinguish itself from the goliaths to its east and west.

America’s commitment to human rights began at a moment of weakness. In the wake of the military and moral disaster of Vietnam, President Jimmy Carter and the US Congress sought to infuse American foreign policy with a moral center and reached for the language of human rights. President Ronald Reagan saw human rights as a convenient rhetorical cudgel for clobbering the Soviet Union. But both presidents continued to support dictatorships that served US security interests, and neither used military force to advance humanitarian ideals. The era of US-led humanitarian intervention would have to await the end of the Cold War.

The rhetoric outstripped the reality, but reality did change. As the sole global hegemon, the US embarked on a large number of wars, big and small, involving a confusing mélange of hard-nosed security interests and idealistic rhetoric. In Panama, Somalia, Yugoslavia (twice), Iraq (twice), Libya, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, the US launched military interventions on both national-security and humanitarian grounds.

The nonintervention in the Rwandan genocide of 1994 may have been the most consequential (non)event of this period, because it was reinterpreted with the benefit of hindsight as a missed opportunity to use military force to save hundreds of thousands of lives. The debacle was used to justify the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and to urge US military intervention in Sudan in the early 2000s, which President George W. Bush’s administration wisely resisted, despite mass killings that amounted to another genocide.

All of this led to an extraordinary burst of interest in international law and legal institutions. Multiple international tribunals were created, leading to the establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court. Human rights treaties and institutions were revived and strengthened. Principles of humanitarian intervention were advanced, including the now-forgotten “responsibility to protect.” Every Western university nowadays has a human rights center of some sort that is a testament to the idealism of that era.

It was already clear that President Donald Trump repudiated this tradition of humanitarian or quasi-humanitarian military intervention, but Biden’s forceful renunciation of it is somewhat surprising. In his speech, he repeatedly emphasized the importance of identifying and defending America’s “vital national interest.” The word “national” is key, and Biden wasn’t subtle:

“If we had been attacked on September 11, 2001, from Yemen instead of Afghanistan, would we have ever gone to war in Afghanistan? Even though the Taliban controlled Afghanistan in the year 2001? I believe the honest answer is no. That’s because we had no vital interest in Afghanistan other than to prevent an attack on America’s homeland and our friends. And that’s true today.”

America had no vital interest in introducing democracy to Afghanistan, in helping women escape a medieval theological regime, in educating children, or in helping to prevent another civil war. His decision to withdraw from Afghanistan was

“about ending an era of major military operations to remake other countries. We saw a mission of counterterrorism in Afghanistan, getting the terrorists to stop the attacks, morph into a counterinsurgency, nation-building, trying to create a democratic, cohesive, and united Afghanistan. Something that has never been done over many centuries of Afghan’s [sic] history. Moving on from that mindset and those kind of large-scale troop deployments will make us stronger and more effective and safer at home.”

Biden also did say that human rights will remain “the center of our foreign policy,” and that economic tools and moral suasion can be used to advance them. This claim is in tension with his declaration that “vital national interests” should determine military intervention. Why wouldn’t vital national interests determine nonmilitary forms of intervention as well? Clearly, the role of human rights and other moral ideals in US foreign policy has been downgraded. The only question is whether the rhetoric will be toned town to match the new reality.

Of course, it was never very clear that US governments were actually motivated by humanitarian considerations. Critics often found more nefarious motives. Future historians may well argue that US foreign policy in the 1990s and 2000s was simply advancing a very ambitious vision of the national interest: America required all countries to adopt American ideals and institutions so that none would want to act against America. Or they might say that, like any empire, the US lacked the patience and wisdom to maintain a consistent stance in its treatment of its peripheries.

In any case, idealism is not actually so idealistic when a country has enough power, and the only thing that is clear now is that America doesn’t. Resistance to its post-Cold War nation-building goals took the form of international terrorism. China and Russia did not obediently embrace democracy. And much of the rest of the world has reverted to various forms of nationalism and authoritarianism.

#### Heg decline triggers US lash-out

**Beckley 12** [“China’s Century Why America’s Edge Will Endure” research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs He will become an assistant professor of political science at Tufts University in the fall of 2012, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Chinas\_Century.pdf]

One danger is that declinism could prompt **trade conflicts** and immigration restrictions. The results of this study suggest that the United States beneªts immensely from the free ºow of goods, services, and people around the globe; this is what allows American corporations to specialize in high-value activities, exploit innovations created elsewhere, and lure the brightest minds to the United States, all while reducing the price of goods for U.S. consumers. Characterizing China’s export expansion as a loss for the United States is not just bad economics; it blazes a trail for jingoistic and protectionist policies. It would be tragically ironic if Americans reacted to false prophecies of decline by cutting themselves off from a potentially vital source of American power.

Another danger is that declinism may impair foreign policy decisionmaking. If top government officials come to believe that China is overtaking the United States, they are likely to react in one of two ways, both of which are potentially disastrous.

The first is that policymakers may imagine the United States faces a closing “window of opportunity” and should take action “while it still enjoys preponderance and not wait until the diffusion of power has already made international politics more competitive and unpredictable.”158 This belief may spurpositive action, but it also invites parochial thinking, reckless behavior, and **preventive war**.159 As Robert Gilpin and others have shown, “[H]egemonic struggles have most frequently been triggered by fears of ultimate decline and the perceived erosion of power.”160 By fanning such fears, declinists may inadvertently promote the type of violent overreaction that they seek to prevent.

## 1NC – Case

### 1NC – Presumption

Vote neg on presumption – no reason the ballot is key and the injection of the scholarhisp already happened

### 1NC – THEORY

Their theory of whiteness is overbroad and not nuanced – they have combined racist interactions, liberalism, capitalism, and a host of other systems under “whiteness” - every system they add makes solvency markedly more difficult –

However it is NOT the belief in property OR individual debate norms that makes it true, but rather the military’s protection of it, the constitution’s protection of it, overwhelming societal belief from a large majority in Americans in the idea of owning their own property protected through legal contracts, etc – that proves the locus of power is not individual, disproves the efficacy of their micropolitical movement and disproves their theory of where power operates

Also proves a host of alt causes to property-based subjectivities that begin with childhoods, friendships, religion, and upbringing that all have a materially substantially larger impact on subjectivities then small changes of the aff

### 1NC– Antitrust Good

#### Monopoly capitalism worsens racism and antitrust advocacy strengthens every angle of resistance.

Greer and Rice, 21—co-founders and co-executive directors of Liberation in a Generation (Jeremie and Solana, “Anti-Monopoly Activism: Reclaiming Power through Racial Justice,” <https://www.liberationinageneration.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Anti-Monopoly-Activism_032021.pdf>, dml) [language modifications denoted by brackets]

Since the founding of the nation, people of color have been living an economic nightmare. People of color have persistently lagged behind white people in nearly every economic category, including employment, income, education, small-business ownership, home ownership, and asset-ownership. This is the result of the rise and reach of concentrated wealth and power, including monopoly power.

The Racial Wealth Gap

Economic racial disparities do not happen by accident. Rather, they are the product of centuries of systemic racism and have been built into the design of our economic system, which has created what we at Liberation in a Generation call the Oppression Economy. The Oppression Economy uses the racist tools of theft, exclusion, and 31 exploitation to strip wealth from people of color, so that the elite can build their wealth. In this Oppression Economy, racism is profitable, and it fuels a cycle of oppression 32 that depresses the economic vitality of people of color, suppresses our political power, and obstructs our ability to utilize democracy to change economic rules that make racism profitable in the first place.

Racial wealth inequality is the consequential disease caused by the Oppression Economy. Today, racial wealth inequality has reached astronomical levels and will continue to rise if nothing is done. Without drastic policy action it will take 228 years for average Black wealth and 84 years for average Latinx wealth to match the wealth that white households hold today. Further, if nothing is done—or we attempt to return 33 to “normal” and fail to distance racism34 after COVID-19—Black and Latinx wealth will reach zero sometime in the middle of this century. These disparities are driven by 35 36 two reinforcing phenomena connected to the issue of corporate concentration: 1) the systematic withholding of wealth from people of color and 2) the gross concentration of wealth held by the corporate elite.

Between 1983 and 2016, which coincides with the rise of corporate and monopoly power, average Black and Latinx wealth was dwarfed [outpaced] by the wealth accumulated by white households. In fact, average Black wealth decreased by more than 50 percent over this period. This is the result of a long history of economic oppression that has 37 actively blocked people of color from building wealth or has stripped their wealth through theft and predation. The beneficiaries and perpetrators of this ever-growing gap are the corporate elite who set the rules of the economy. The corporate elite’s actions have led to people of color being paid less for their labor and having to pay more for the basic necessities of life. Here are a few metrics that speak to this reality.

• Black, Indigenous, and Latinx women earn between 55 cents and 63 cents for every dollar earned by white men.38

• Low income people of color often pay a 10 percent poverty premium for essential goods and services.39

• Black and Latinx households are far more likely than white households to be unable to pay their monthly bills or cover unexpected expenses.40

• Black households are more likely to be denied mortgage credit and end up paying more when they are able to access credit.41

• Black households, in particular, suffer from a crippling debt burden composed of an array of predatory credit products (e.g., student, small-dollar, auto, and home loans).

The phenomenon fueling racial wealth inequality is the concentration of wealth in the hands of a small number of individuals. Today, the wealthiest 400 people in the US hold more wealth ($3.2 trillion) than the entire Latinx population ($2.4 trillion)and 43 more than 70 percent of the Black population combined ($4.41 trillion). While the 44 average wealth of Black people has decreased since the 1980s (as cited earlier), the average wealth of those on Forbes’s list of the 400 wealthiest people increased from $600 million in 1982 (adjusted for inflation) to $8.0billion in 2020.. You might be 45 asking, what does the Forbes 400have to do with monopoly? Well, it is a who’s who of corporate monopolists.

The people on this list are some of the most egregious perpetrators of driving down wages, expanding income inequality, degrading the health of workers, desecrating the environment, fleecing consumers, perpetuating racial residential segregation, driving community disinvestment, avoiding taxes, and corrupting our democracy. These monopolists utilize ruthless business practices to perpetuate their unquenchable thirst for maximized profits and for control of major segments of the US economy—and people of color bear the brunt.

America’s Legacy of Racism Drives and Sustains Corporate Concentration

The confluence of monopoly power and racial inequality is not new. The construction of an economy that relies on unchecked capitalism to create the modern-day monopolist relies on the construction and maintenance of America’s racial caste system. The legacy of theft, exclusion, and exploitation of people of color by corporate monopolists has been with us since the founding of the nation. In fact, prior to the Civil War, southern plantation owners were the equivalent of the modern-day Fortune 500 monopolists. The Mississippi Valley had more millionaires per capita than anywhere in the country, making it the Silicon Valley of that period. Prior to the Civil War, the combined value of America’s approximately 4 million slaves was $3.5 billion, making it the largest single financial asset in the entire economy, bigger than all manufacturing and railroads combined.46

As the roots of this problem run deep and disproportionately impact people of color, so too must the solutions. Today’s corporate monopolies are built on the foundation of an economy that also stole land from Indigenous people through genocide and forced removal, and built a labor market on the bodies of enslaved Black people. Nothing in our economy is race-neutral, including our work to dismantle monopoly power and the racial wealth inequality it causes, so we must seek race-conscious solutions.

Scholars have developed a catalogue of research confirming what many people of color experience on a daily basis: Corporations have seized control of many aspects of our lives that were once intended to serve the public good over private sector interests. Examples include the growth of charter schools and for-profit colleges as an alternative to public schools; the growth of private health insurance and private hospitals; the growth of private prisons and paid services in prison, such as phone calls and health care. However, more research is needed that connects the economic conditions of people of color to the growth of monopoly power, a call to action we further explore in Section 6.

Connecting Monopoly Power to Other Movements

There is no silver bullet to slaying the monster that is systemic racism. Leaders of color across the country are actively organizing people of color to advance bold and transformational economic and racial justice policies. These leaders are doing the hard work of transforming our economic systems by advancing liberatory policies such as a Homes Guarantee and a federal jobs guarantee; and by dismantling systems of oppression, including police and prison abolition, ending voter suppression, and curbing corporate power. To this end, anti-monopoly policy and advocacy work can be a powerful tool to advance these transformative, activist-led movement priorities.

To win the battle to advance movement priorities, we must seek to pull every lever of power at our disposal and to directly confront one of their most ardent political opponents: corporate monopolies. The Action Center on Race and the Economy (ACRE) is deftly integrating anti-monopoly tactics to advance their racial and economic justice mission. In advancing police abolition, for example, they highlight the fact that big banks (as discussed in Section 1) finance “police brutality bonds” that fund the payment of police department settlements for acts of police brutality.47 Additionally, they have highlighted for grassroots leaders of color the connections that corporate monopolies have to anti-Muslim bigotry, the Puerto Rican debt crisis, and pharmaceutical prices.48

Corporate monopolists, including big banks, big tech, and big pharma, are often primary opponents in the battles for bold, transformational movement priorities. For example, activists for bold environmental justice policies, such as the Green New Deal, have encountered strong opposition from fossil fuel monopolies, such as Exxon, Shell and BP; but also, Wall Street bank monopolies financing fossil fuel monopolies, in addition to other monopolies in the airline industry. In another example, Wall Street 49 monopolies have aggressively clashed with affordable housing advocates as their investments have displaced residents of color from their homes and businesses and have also gentrified communities of color from Harlem to Oakland and Detroit to New Orleans. Directly challenging the monopoly power of these corporations could prove to be a useful tactic for activists of color to further movement priorities.

#### Researching and advocating anti-monopoly policy can boost grassroots activism and repurpose government structures for liberation, but we must focus on concrete impacts over abstraction.

Greer and Rice, 21—co-founders and co-executive directors of Liberation in a Generation (Jeremie and Solana, “Anti-Monopoly Activism: Reclaiming Power through Racial Justice,” <https://www.liberationinageneration.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Anti-Monopoly-Activism_032021.pdf>, dml)

We believe that the movement—within research and advocacy spaces especially—should embolden grassroot leaders of color to deliver antiracist policy solutions aimed specifically to curtail monopoly power. Below, we provide considerations for future action that are not policies or regulations or campaigns in and of themselves, but ideas that could transform the anti-monopoly movement in ways that require it to reimagine itself and approach the work through a racial justice lens.

Develop More In-Depth, Intentional Research

Part of the impetus for writing this document is that Liberation in a Generation believes that the power to change our economic systems rests with the organizers of color who are (re)building the political strength of communities of color. The research and advocacy to limit monopoly power needs to better quantify, center, and reflect the ways that people of color are being harmed. This means conducting research that centers the impact of monopoly power on people of color (as workers, consumers, community members, and participants in our democracy). The research and advocacy need to be relevant to the organizers who are indeed experiencing and fighting many of these forces on the ground, and it should inform solutions that they develop, nurture, and advance through activism. The research and advocacy must use less jargon and abstraction, focusing less on markets, firms, or efficiencies, and it should talk more about the impact of corporate decisions on people, their lives, and their futures. The tent of advocates working on anti-monopoly needs to widen as well. Bringing in the people most impacted is essential to shaping and accomplishing the path forward.

Draw Connections Between Monopoly Power and Current Movement Priorities

As discussed earlier in this paper monopoly power has enormous impact on other movement priorities led by leaders of color, such as environmental justice, worker justice, housing justice, police and prison abolition, closing the racial wealth gap, and democratic disenfranchisement. Anti-monopoly policy can be a powerful tool to accomplish existing movement priorities, including the Green New Deal, a Homes Guarantee, a federal jobs guarantee, and Medicare for All. In order to fully utilize it as a tool, anti-monopoly advocates must support—mainly in the background—grassroots leaders of color in integrating anti-monopoly policy and advocacy strategies into the existing campaigns they are leading. By following their lead, and by working together to curb corporate power, we as a collective progressive movement can accomplish an array of movement priorities and move the US closer to liberation for people of color.

Build Solutions That Are Antiracist and Center People of Color as Beneficiaries

It’s not enough to speak virtuously about racial equity and economic justice; we have to intentionally center people of color in the development of policy change. To the previous point, advocates and researchers who evaluate solutions to corporate concentration should include a measure of impacts on Black, Latinx, Indigenous, Asian, and Pacific Islander people. As consumers, entrepreneurs, and residents, we are the ones most vulnerable to the inequities, the forced scarcity, and price gouging inflicted by corporate concentration, among other problems. History has shown us that race-neutral approaches only exacerbate that vulnerability by entrenching current systems—systems that are inherently racist. We know that “race-neutral” policies assume whiteness as the norm and thus serve and preserve white supremacy. So, advancing anti-monopoly policy that is antiracist and centers people of color must be the standard that we all follow moving forward.

Think Bigger and Bolder Than Existing Regulations and Agencies

Large segments of the current anti-monopoly legal and regulatory infrastructure are corrupted beyond repair. Further, these systems are complicit in the economic oppression of people of color. The goals of the anti-monopoly movement should be to completely dismantle our systems of oppression and replace them with government systems that deliver economic liberation. Our regulatory structure is complicated, spread across many agencies, and lacking enforcement power. The complexity of our nation’s anti-monopoly laws, regulations, and oversight have been designed to advantage monopolists with unlimited resources to navigate the labyrinth of our anti-monopoly laws.

Racial oppression thrives in this environment and the antimonopoly movement must resist the urge to settle for small marginal victories that allow this oppression to continue. Breaking up Amazon or Facebook will be a hollow victory if they are able to reform years later and continue to harm Black and brown workers, consumers, and small businesses. The path forward should be to join grassroots leaders of color to create new, bold and transformative solutions (e.g., new agencies and new authorities) that will ensure that federal and state governments advance the economic well-being of people of color and not that of the monopolists that oppresses them.

Tell a New Visionary Story About the Role of Corporations

We need a story that is visionary and that repositions corporations as beholden to serving the public interest, re-examining the purpose of corporations and developing mechanisms that evaluate, even redefine, that purpose. Currently, companies’ driving purpose is to create wealth for their shareholders, and this ideology is to the detriment of people of color. We must integrate solutions that challenge our current approach to corporate governance, incorporation, and tax policy that reinforce economic systems of oppression that allow monopolies exploit to harm people of color.

Conclusion

Imagine a world where the unemployment rate for people of color is zero. The unhoused rate for people of color is zero. A world in which 100 percent of people of color have quality health care, a livable wage, and a quality education. We at Liberation in a Generation believe that this is possible if we strive to create a Liberation Economy where all people of color have their basic needs met, are safe and secure, are valued, and fully belong, including people of color who are immigrants, formerly incarcerated, LGBTQ+, and have a disability. In order to get to this Liberation Economy, we must dismantle the Oppression Economy that monopoly power has colluded with the government to maintain. There are signs that we are moving in the right direction; we need to deepen the urgency and refine the strategy to advance these opportunities.

The Oppression Economy, which includes financial markets, labor markets, and interstate and international trading companies, was arranged to serve an economy elevated by the theft of labor from Black people. Today, Black people and other people of color are still delivering uncompensated value to monopoly power as minimum wage essential workers, as consumers without choice, as small businesses beholden to tight supply chains, as students trying to pay for a college education, and as residents of modern-day company towns.

Despite the disproportionate and anticompetitive influence these monopolies have on the consumer and labor market, they are, structurally, corporations. They have CEOs who manage the day-to-day of the company. They have boards of directors responsible for maintaining corporate governance. They have shareholders that they are accountable for serving. Finally, they are subject to corporate and tax laws and regulations internationally and in the US.

One of the highpoints of 2020 came in December when the FTC joined 48 states and territories to bring a lawsuit against Google for violating the United State’s antimonopoly laws. This suit has the potential to be the most significant action taken by the federal government since the 1998 suit against Microsoft. Further, earlier in 2020, the House of Representatives Judiciary Subcommittee issued a report urging action by Congress and the administration to rein in the monopoly power of Big Tech. Major democratic presidential candidates, including now-President Biden, prioritized curbing corporate monopoly power as major planks in their presidential campaigns. There appears to be momentum on the side of bold government intervention, and grassroots leaders of color can capitalize on that momentum.

Thankfully, momentum also appears to be on the side of advancing racial justice. The tragic murders of Breonna Taylor, George Floyd, and Elijah McClain—and far too many before them and since—have once again thrust the issue of systemic racism into the public consciousness. We will see if this amplified awareness materializes into sustained progress, but this is clearly a moment to advance ideas that would have previously been dismissed by mainstream institutions—such as activist calls to defund the police. It is incumbent upon us in the racial justice movement to ensure that these tragic deaths vault our fight for justice to the next stage of evolution, and that they inform our approach to curbing the corporate monopoly power that is a contributing factor to our collective pain.

The time is now. It’s time to accelerate grassroots efforts to rein in monopoly power. It’s time to accomplish this by advancing bold transformative policy interventions that rip the power to pilot our economy from corporate monopolies. It’s time to ground our understanding of how monopoly works against the principles of racial and economic justice. Finally, it's time to follow grassroots leaders of color in accomplishing this goal —and in delivering liberation for us all.

### 1NC - Reed

#### Exposing contradictions and deeper analysis fails – small moments of resistance don’t have transformative potential or overcome institutions

Reed 16 (Adolph, Jr., Prof. of Political Science @ Penn., “Splendors and Miseries of the Antiracist “Left”” *Nonsite*, http://nonsite.org/editorial/splendors-and-miseries-of-the-antiracist-left-2)

More than a decade and a half ago I criticized similar formulations of a notion of “infrapolitics,” understood as the domain of pre-political acts of everyday “resistance” undertaken by subordinated populations, which was then all the rage in cultural studies programs. Proponents of the political importance of this domain insisted that, because insurgent movements emerge within such cultures of quotidian resistance, a) examining them could help in understanding the processes through which insurgencies develop and/or b) they therefore ought to be considered as expressions of an insurgent politics themselves. Several factors accounted for the popularity of that version of the argument, which mainly had to do to with the political economy of academic life, including the self-propulsion of academic trendiness and the atrophy of the left outside the academy, which encouraged flights into fantasy for the sake of optimism. The infrapolitics idea also resonated with the substantive but generally unadmitted group essentialism underlying claims that esoteric, insider knowledge is necessary to decipher the “hidden transcripts” of the subordinate populations; put more bluntly, elevating infrapolitics to the domain on which the oppressed express their politics most authentically increased its interpreters’ academic capital.8

I discussed those factors in my critique. However, the point in that argument most pertinent for evaluating Birch and Heideman’s confidence that the contradictions they acknowledge in BLM should be seen only as growing pains of a “new movement” is the following:

At best, those who romanticize “everyday resistance” or “cultural politics” read the evolution of political movements teleologically; they presume that those conditions necessarily, or even typically, lead to political action. They don’t. Not any more than the presence of carbon and water necessarily leads to the evolution of Homo sapiens. Think about it: infrapolitics is ubiquitous, developed political movements are rare.9

### 1NC – Racial Cap

#### Racial capitalism fails as a theory.

Go 21 – Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago (Julian, “Three Tensions in the Theory of Racial Capitalism”, Sociological Theory, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 38-47, 2021)

What Is the “Race” in Racial Capitalism? We can now turn to the three tensions in the racial capitalism literature, beginning with the issue of race. This is critical. If the term racial capitalism is to have implications for social theory, it must offer rigorously defined concepts constituting a transposable conceptual apparatus. Surely one of those concepts would have to do with “race.” But what exactly is “race”? The problem is that “race” is not typically defined in the existing literature, so it is unclear whether other categories marking difference, such as ethnicity, are more appropriate than race. Should we be thinking about “ethnic capitalism” rather than racial capitalism? Robinson’s (2000) work is a prime example. Nearly all scholars claim that one of Robinson’s key contributions is to show that capitalism was forged from precapitalist racial divisions in Europe. Capitalism is “racial,” according to Robinson, “because racialism had already permeated Western feudal society,” and capitalism was built upon that racialism (Kelley 2017; Táíwò and Bright 1996). The problem is that Robinson himself was not entirely clear that precapitalist social differences were actually “racial.” On one hand, he did use the term race in his analysis. “Racism,” Robinson (2000:2; see also pp. 26–27, 66–67) wrote, served to structure “the ‘internal’ relations of European peoples” prior to capitalism, and capitalism seized on racism as it developed. On other hand, when discussing some of the presumably “racial” groups in feudal Europe, Robinson (2000:10–11) referred to linguistic rather than phenotypical differences, thus equating racial groups with linguistic groups. In fact, when discussing how migratory and immigrant labor formed the basis for the armies of the Absolutist states and for the production of value in early agrarian capitalism, he oscillated between calling them “races” and “ethnic” groups. For instance, Robinson (2000:23) used the phrase “ethnic divisions of sixteenth century immigrant labor,” and he referred to “national” differences when presumably speaking about premodern “racial” differences. Given these ambiguities, Robinson’s argument could be read differently from how it is conventionally taken. It is not that capitalism was built on prior racial differences; rather, capitalism served to racialize the preexisting ethnic division of labor, thereby turning religious, cultural, or linguistic differences into “racial” ones to legitimate its new exploitative structure. In this view, racialization—the process of turning groups into biological entities called “races”—was a part of modern capitalism, not its precursor (cf. Omi and Winant 1986). In some passages, Robinson (2000) said this exactly: “the tendency of European civilization through capitalism was thus not to homogenize but to differentiate—to exaggerate regional, subcultural, and dialectical differences into ‘racial’ ones” (p. 26). Of course, whether “race” preexisted capitalism does not alter the larger argument of the racial capitalism approach, which is that racial differentiation and capitalism are mutually supportive. Still, the tension in Robinson’s work manifests the deeper issue of whether “racial” capitalism refers to race or other identities. This issue permeates Walzer’s (2020) recent criticism of the racial capitalism concept. Walzer points to examples such as Russia and China, where capitalism does not rely on racial differences but rather on ethnic and religious differentiation. “It may be that Muslims are among the most exploited workers in Russia,” he wrote, “but they are mostly Caucasian (some of them the original Caucasians), so we would have to talk about religious capitalism—where Orthodox Christians, not white people, are the privileged group.” On this basis, Walzer rejected the racial capitalism concept as limited at best and analytically debilitating at worse. Skeptics of Walzer have offered a rebuke: his argument misses the global dimensions of capitalism. At issue is not whether racial stratification articulates with capitalism within any single country but whether it permeates the world-capitalist system. Proponents of this argument could readily assemble evidence to show that, on a global scale, the vast majority of the world’s proletariat, subproletariat, and dispossessed—whether cultivating grapes or coffee on the farms of the Americas, cleaning up office floors in London, or making clothes in the sweatshops of New Delhi—are, to borrow DuBois’s (1935) phrase, “yellow, brown and black.” Against Walzer, this would retain the main claim of the racial capitalism approach that race and capitalism are intertwined. Yet this scaling upward of capitalism to a global level brings its own complications. It carries the danger of what Bourdieu and Wacquant (1999) called “the cunning of imperialist [racialist] reason”: an analytic operation by which U.S.-centered scholars impose presumably U.S.-centric classifications (in this case, “race”) onto the rest of the world, thereby imposing racial classifications into contexts where they might not be operative. We would be obliged, for instance, to impose racial classifications onto Latin American contexts such as Brazil, where the salience of racial classifications is debatable (Loveman 1999; Wimmer 2015). In short, if we are to insist on the global character of racial capitalism, we must assume that analysts’ racial classifications are global as well. They may very well be, but racial capitalism’s founding texts, and more recent discussions, have not sufficiently problematized this tension.2 Can this tension be resolved? One way to do so is to raise the possibility that the racial capitalism concept works best for groups that have been undoubtedly racialized, such as members of the African diaspora in North America.3 Racial capitalism would thus refer mainly to the black ex-slave population, which has suffered some of the clearest and most virulent forms of racism. This might explain why the literature on racial capitalism has focused on African Americans and transatlantic slavery rather than other groups elsewhere in the world. Yet this seeming resolution would significantly reduce the scope of the racial capitalism concept. Racial capitalism would no longer depict a global system. Perhaps the best resolution is one that arrives through more reflexive research. We can explore how “race” is connected to capitalism in diverse sites and across historical periods, but we must be more conscious about whether we are referring to analysts’ definition of race or a category of practice. Put simply, we can arrive at a resolution only through careful research that more clearly defines “race.” The Inadequacy of Existing Theory A second tension in the racial capitalism literature has to do with the relationship between this literature and existing social theories of capitalism, in particular, Marxian theories of capitalism. Animating the racial capitalism approach is the claim that Marxian theories of capitalism are inadequate because they obfuscate the racial foundations of capitalism. For Robinson (2000), “Western Marxism . . . has proven insufficiently radical to expose and root out the racialist order that contaminates its analytic and philosophic applications” (p. 317). Historians’ use of the racial capitalism approach is premised on the idea that Marxism does not adequately acknowledge slavery’s role in capitalism or the ongoing importance of colonialism and “primitive accumulation,” which Marx presumably relegated to the margins of his theory (Smallwood 2018). This is exactly why scholars in this tradition insist on the term racial capitalism: because Marxian theory fails to theorize race, we must add the qualifier race to the signifier capitalism. But what if Marxian theory does in fact take into account race, slavery, imperialism, and colonialism, and proponents of the racial capitalism approach merely misread Marx? If so, the warrant, if not the entire premise, for Robinson’s and others’ work on racial capitalism would crater by an unfortunate misreading of Marxian theory. A number of scholars, in fact, already push against the notion that Marxist thought does not account for race, slavery, or colonialism. Drawing largely on Marx’s journalistic writings, they show that Marx not only discussed race, slavery, and colonialism but saw them as central for capitalism. According to this argument, Marx saw race as so crucial for capitalism that his theory saw the true proletariat as black, brown, and yellow—directly contrary to Robinson’s claim that Marxist theory only saw the white European proletariat as the true subject of history (Anderson 2010; Foster, Holleman, and Clark 2020; Ralph and Singhal 2019). If true, the racial capitalism literature is based on a “misguided reading of Marx” (Ralph and Singhal 2019:864). How might this apparent aporia in Marxian theory be resolved, if at all? It is imperative here to register a distinction between Marx’s theory of capital and his theory of capitalism. 4 The former is sketched in Marx’s mature social theory in Capital and related writings such as The Grundrisse (Postone 1996). These writings offer a formalized and abstract representation of the inner workings of capital, its accumulation, its contradictions, and its necessary demise through a series of central categories that capture the key elements of the capitalist system. At this level of abstraction, the main categories of the theory (e.g., “value,” “surplus value,” “concrete labor,” “abstract labor,” “capital,” “socially necessary labor time”) are devoid of any historical specificity or social content and as such can be applied to distinct historical phases or social formations (e.g., capitalism in the eighteenth-century transatlantic world or Russia in 1998, or the twenty-first-century global system). Categories of race, gender, or ethnicity are therefore not central, because they are too concrete. Alternatively, a theory of capitalism refers to capitalist development and dynamics in their empirical specificity. It is meant to explain and describe specific capitalist formations and developments as they really exist in the world, not their abstract conceptual form. This theory can be extracted from Marx’s journalistic writings and other essays, and it is here where issues such as slavery and ethnicity arise: the essays refer to real events and pressing issues in actually existing capitalism, such as the Civil War or the Irish question (Anderson 2010). But these observations or statements on concrete processes and relations such as slavery in actually existing capitalism—that is, Marx’s theory of capitalism—do not disturb or reconfigure his theory of capital, which remains focused on the relations of wage labor induced to a highly abstract level from his analysis of textile production. If and when he did discuss things such as slavery, such as in “The Working Day” section in Capital, he treated slavery as a passing phase or outside capital’s inner logic, a sort of heuristic to better apprehend and illuminate the latter (Marx [1867] 1906:328–30; on slavery as a heuristic, see Smallwood 2018). This distinction between Marx’s theory of capitalism and his theory of capital helps us better approach the debate generated by the racial capitalism literature. When Robinson or other proponents of the racial capitalism idea critique Marx’s theory for eliding or deliberately occluding race, slavery, and colonialism, they are critiquing his theory of capital, not his theory of capitalism. Here proponents of the racial capitalism approach are on solid ground. Marx’s theory of capitalism does take into account race, slavery, and colonialism, but his theory of capital renders these things marginal at best.5 Hence the warrant for the racial capitalism approach: because Marx’s theory of capital does not center race, the racial capitalism concept and the research and theorizing that go under its banner can fill the void. The concept may provide the basis for an alternative theory not only of racial capitalism but also of racialized capital. Necessity, Contingency, and Difference The final tension within racial capitalism is whether the interconnectedness of racial difference and capitalism is a logical or contingent necessity.6 If, as the racial capitalism literature suggests, slavery and its associated logics of racism have been crucial for the development of capitalism, and if global capitalism today remains intertwined with racial stratification, to what extent are these relations intrinsic to capitalism or accidental? Put differently, is capitalism necessarily racist (Fraser 2019; Lemann 2020)?7 For some, the relationship is only contingent. Walzer (2020) argued that in some countries, capitalism proceeds along just fine without racial difference,

and if there is racial difference on a global scale, it is historically contingent. Although the vast majority of workers are nonwhite, Walzer suggested that this is not due to any intrinsic logic of capitalism but rather the accident of demographics (because most of the world is nonwhite, the majority of the world’s workers will be nonwhite). For this reason, Walzer suggested we disavow the racial capitalism concept. Alternatively, others claim that racism is indeed intrinsic to capitalism.8 There are two versions of this claim. One is that racism is necessary to divide the working class and legitimate the rule of the bourgeoisie. Racism is an ideological necessity of capitalism, justifying its unequal relations (Camp, Heatherton, and Karuka 2019; McCarthy 2016; Taylor 2016). “Capitalism requires inequality,” suggested Gilmore (2015), “and racism enshrines it.” A very different version, coming most predominantly from Fraser (2019), is that capitalism necessarily entails relations of exploitation and expropriation that feed off each other. Exploitation is the extraction of value from “free subjects” through wage labor. But expropriation, which includes slavery and colonialism, extracts value from racialized “dependent subjects” and is what enables exploitation to happen in the first place. Expropriation is “a necessary background condition for the exploitation of ‘workers’” (Fraser 2019) and therefore for capitalism itself. Capitalism is thus logically dependent upon racism.9 So what is the answer? Again, it helps differentiate between a theory of capital and a theory of capitalism. A theory of capitalism might demonstrate that race has been historically necessary for capitalist accumulation by reference to empirical reality: historically, capitalism and race have always been intertwined. But the claim that race is a logical necessity to capitalism would have to derive from a theory of capital, not from empirics alone. One would have to deduce, from the categories of Marx’s theory, the necessity of racism or racial differentiation in society. On this score, the arguments for the logical necessity of capitalism’s entanglements with race fall short. Consider the argument that racism is necessary for capitalism because capitalism requires racist ideology to divide the working class. This is a functionalist argument that is not functionalist enough, for it effaces the logical possibility of functional substitution. We may find that racism has historically always functioned to divide the working class, but in theory other “isms” could serve the same function. There is nothing inherent to the logic of capital that requires race to be the ideology of division (Lebowitz 2006:39).10 Why not ethnicity? Why not sexuality? Consider Fraser’s argument that expropriation is intrinsic to capitalism and that racial differentiation must be too. It is plausible and indeed persuasive to claim that expropriation is necessary for capitalism, but it is less persuasive to claim that racial difference is logically necessary for expropriation. Gender could easily serve as the main axis of dependent classification (and, to feminist-Marxist thought, it has served that function), as could ethnicity, religion, sexuality, or citizenship. Fraser would have to show that expropriation, and hence capitalism, requires a racial classification as opposed to other social categories. This is a task left unfulfilled.11 A different and possibly more productive route would be to reframe the issue as one of social difference rather than race. Is racism necessary for capitalism? There are good reasons, as just mentioned, to think not. But is social difference of various types (from race to gender to ethnicity) necessary for capitalism?12 This is more demonstrable, both empirically (by reference to actually existing capitalism) and theoretically (by reference to the logic of capital accumulation). For example, Fraser’s argument about expropriation could be reformulated in the following manner: expropriation is logically necessary for exploitation, which is in turn necessary for capital accumulation, and expropriation requires differentiation among workers. This differentiation could be along racial lines, or it could be along other lines such as gender, but differentiation there must be. Note that this argument logically insinuates a racial component but remains abstract enough to account for other possible identities across different capitalist formations. It can account for racialized slave labor in the eighteenth-century transatlantic world (where “race” was a key axis of differentiation), twentieth-century Russia (where ethnicity or religion might be the important axis), or gender across all these formations. This is just one possibility. There are others. Chakrabarty (1993), for instance, seized on Marx’s categories of “abstract” and “real” labor to write difference into Marx’s theoretical architecture. “Abstract labor” generated by capitalism refers to a homogeneity among different and otherwise incommensurable labors. It is the register of the juridical free subject. But “real” labor marks have heterogeneity that registers the incommensurability of different labors. It therefore refers to a difference that stands “only as a Derridean trace of something that cannot be enclosed” (Chakrabarty 1993:1096). Exactly how persuasive is Chakrabarty’s rereading remains to be seen. The point is that this effort, and others like it, speak to theoretical possibilities that the racial capitalism literature opens up but has yet to pursue thoroughly. More could be done.13

### 1NC - Glaude

#### Government action is key—reform can pursue genuine equality - defeatist attitudes ensure that the world stays the same and cede politics.

Eddie S. GLAUDE Jr., Professor of African American Studies and Religion at Princeton and a PhD in Religion from Princeton, 16 [*Democracy in Black: How Race Still Enslaves*, p. 185-197]

CHANGE HOW WE VIEW GOVERNMENT For more than three decades, we have been bludgeoned with an idea of government that has little to no concern for the public good. Big government is bad, we are told. It is inefficient, and its bloated bureaucracies are prone to corruption. Even Democrats, especially since Bill Clinton, have taken up this view. For example, Obama says, "We don't need big government; we need smart government." For some on the right, big government is bad because it aims to distribute wealth to those who are lazy and undeserving. "Big government" is just a shorthand for dreaded entitlement programs-all too often coded language for race. In this view, "big government" is the primary agent of enforcing racial equality, taking hard-earned stuff from white Americans and giving it to undeserving others. Government cannot do such a thing, they argue, without infringing on the rights of white Americans. And even government-mandated redistribution will not solve the problem. As Barry Goldwater put the point in 1964, "No matter how we try, we cannot pass a law that will make you like me or me like you. The key to racial and religious tolerance lies not in laws alone but, ultimately, in the hearts of men." From this perspective, government plays no role in changing our racial habits. Why would we want to make it bigger? But Goldwater failed to realize that governmental indifference can harden hearts, and government action can create conditions that soften them. People's attitudes aren't static or untouchable. They are molded by the quality of interactions with others, and one of the great powers of government involves shaping those interactions-not determining them in any concrete sense, but defining the parameters within which people come to know each other and live together. Today, for example, most Americans don't believe women should be confined to the home raising children, or subjected to crude advances and sexist remarks by men. The women's-rights movement put pressure on the government, which in turn passed laws that helped change some of our beliefs about women. Similarly, the relative progress of the 1960s did not happen merely by using the blunt instruments of the law. Change emerged from the ways those laws, with grassroots pressure, created new patterns of interactions, and ultimately new habits. Neither Obama's election to the presidency nor my appointment as a Princeton professor would have happened were it not for these new patterns and habits. None of this happens overnight. It takes time and increasing vigilance to protect and secure change. I was talking with a dose friend and he mentioned a basic fact: that we were only fifteen years removed from the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 when Ronald Reagan was elected president and Republicans began to dismantle the gains of the black freedom struggle. Civil rights legislation and the policies of the Great Society had just started to reshape our interactions when they started to be rolled back. We barely had a chance to imagine America anew-to pursue what full employment might look like, to let the abolition of the death penalty settle in, to question seriously the morality of putting people in prison cells, and to enact policies that would undo what the 1968 Kerner Commission described as "two Americas"­ before the attack on "big government" or, more precisely, the attack on racial equality was launched. The objective was to shrink the size of government ("to starve the beast") and to limit its domestic responsibilities to ensuring economic efficiency and national defense. Democrats eventually buckled, and this is the view of government, no matter who is in office, that we have today. It has become a kind of touchstone of faith among most Americans that government is wasteful and should be limited in its role-that it shouldn't intrude on our lives. Politicians aren't the only ones who hold this view. Many Americans do, too. Now we can't even imagine serious talk of things like full employment or the abolition of prisons. We have to change our view of government, especially when it comes to racial matters. Government policy ensured the vote for African Americans and dismantled legal segregation. Policy established a social safety net for the poor and elderly; it put in place the conditions for the growth of our cities. All of this didn't happen simply because of individual will or thanks to some abstract idea of America. It was tied up with our demands and expectations. Goldwater was wrong. So was Reagan. And, in many ways, so is Obama. Our racial habits are shaped by the kind of society in which we live, and our government plays a big role in shaping that society. As young children, our community offers us a way of seeing the world; it lets us know what is valuable and sacred, and what stands as virtuous behavior and what does not. When Michael Brown's body was left in the street for more than four hours, it sent a dear message about the value of black lives. When everything in our society says that we should be less concerned about black folk, that they are dangerous, that no specific policies can address their misery, we say to our children and to everyone else that these people are "less than"-that they fall outside of our moral concern. We say, without using the word, that they are niggers. One way to change that view is to enact policies that suggest otherwise. Or, to put it another way, to change our view of government, we must change our demands of government. For example, for the past fifty years African American unemployment has been twice that of white unemployment. The 2013 unemployment rate for African Americans stood at 13.1 percent, the highest annual black unemployment rate in more than seventy years. Social scientists do not generally agree on the causes of this trend. Some attribute it to the fact that African Americans are typically the "last hired and first fired." Others point to changes in the nature of the economy; still others point to overt racial discrimination in the labor market. No matter how we account for the numbers, the fact remains that most Americans see double-digit black unemployment as "normal." However, a large-scale, comprehensive jobs agenda with a living wage designed to put Americans, and explicitly African Americans, to work would go a long way toward uprooting the racial habits that inform such a view. It would counter the nonsense that currently stands as a reason for long-term black unemployment in public debate: black folk are lazy and don't want to work. If we hold the view that government plays a crucial role in ensuring the public good-if we believe that all Americans, no matter their race or class, can be vital contributors to our beloved community-then we reject the idea that some populations are disposable, that some people can languish in the shadows while the rest of us dance in the light. The question ''Am I my brother's or my sister's keeper?" is not just a question for the individual or a mantra to motivate the private sector. It is a question answered in the social arrangements that aim to secure the goods and values we most cherish as a community. In other words, we need an idea of government that reflects the value of all Americans, not just white Americans or a few people with a lot of money. We need government seriously committed to racial justice. As a nation, we can never pat ourselves on the back about racial matters. We have too much blood on our hands. Remembering that fact-our inheritance, as Wendell Berry said-does not amount to beating ourselves over the head, or wallowing in guilt, or trading in race cards. Remembering our national sins serves as a check and balance against national hubris. We're reminded of what we are capable of, and our eyes are trained to see that ugliness when it rears its head. But when we disremember-when we forget about the horrors of lynching, lose sight of how African Americans were locked into a dual labor market because of explicit racism, or ignore how we exported our racism around the world-we free ourselves from any sense of accountability. Concern for others and a sense of responsibility for the whole no longer matter. Cruelty and indifference become our calling cards. We have to isolate those areas in which long-standing trends of racial inequality short-circuit the life chances of African Americans. In addition to a jobs agenda, we need a comprehensive government response to the problems of public education and mass incarceration. And I do mean a government response. Private interests have overrun both areas, as privatization drives school reform (and the education of our children is lost in the boisterous battles between teachers' unions and private interests) and as big business makes enormous profits from the warehousing of black and brown people in prisons. Let's be clear: private interests or market-based strategies will not solve the problems we face as a country or bring about the kind of society we need. We have to push for massive government investment in early childhood education and in shifting the center of gravity of our society from punishment to restorative justice. We can begin to enact the latter reform by putting an end to the practice of jailing children. Full stop. We didn't jail children in the past. We don't need to now. In sum, government can help us go a long way toward uprooting racial habits with policies that support jobs with a living wage, which would help wipe out the historic double-digit gap between white and black unemployment; take an expansive approach to early childhood education, which social science research consistently says profoundly affects the life chances of black children; and dismantle the prison-industrial complex. We can no longer believe that disproportionately locking up black men and women constitutes an answer to social ills. This view of government cannot be dismissed as a naive pipe dream, because political considerations relentlessly attack our political imaginations and limit us to the status quo. We are told before we even open our mouths that this particular view won't work or that it will never see the light of day. We've heard enough of that around single payer health care reform and other progressive policies over the Obama years. Such defeatist attitudes conspire to limit our imaginations and make sure that the world stays as it is. But those of us who don't give a damn about the rules of the current political game must courageously organize, advocate, and insist on the moral and political significance of a more robust role for government. We have to change the terms of political debate. Something dramatic has to happen. American democracy has to be remade. John Dewey, the American philosopher, understood this: The very idea of democracy, the meaning of democracy, must be continually explored afresh; it has to be constantly discovered and rediscovered, remade and reorganized; while the political and economic and social institutions in which it is embodied have to be remade and reorganized to meet the changes that are going on in the development of new needs on the part of human beings and new resources for satisfying these needs. Dewey saw American democracy as an unfinished project. He knew that the aims and purposes of this country were not fixed forever in the founding documents, but the particular challenges of our moment required imaginative leaps on behalf of democracy itself. Otherwise, undemocratic forces might prevail; tyranny in the form of the almighty dollar and the relentless pursuit of it might overtake any commitment to the idea of the public good; and bad habits might diminish our moral imaginations. The remaking of America will not happen inside the Beltway. Too many there have too much invested in the status quo. A more robust idea of government will not emerge from the current political parties. Both are beholden to big money. Substantive change will have to come from us. Or, as the great civil rights leader Ella Baker said, "we are the leaders we've been looking for"-a model of leadership that scares the hell out of the Reverena Sharpton. We will have to challenge the status quo in the streets and at the ballot box. In short, it will take a full-blown democratic awakening to enact this revolution. On February 7, 2014, I flew to Raleigh, North Carolina, to join with tens of thousands of other like-minded people to protest the draconian laws passed by the North Carolina state legislature. Since 2010, while many people-especially black people-were still reeling from the 2008 recession/depression, Republicans eliminated Medicaid coverage for half a million North Carolinians, passed a voter-ID law designed to disenfranchise primarily African American voters, transferred $90 million from public schools to voucher schools and cut pre-K for 30,000 children, passed a law requiring women about to have an abortion to listen to the heartbeat of the fetus, repealed the earned income tax credit for 900,000 people, and constitutionally banned gay marriage. North Carolina Republicans had declared war. They represented clear examples of those who hold a view of government that hardens hearts and reinforces racial habits. I watched from afar as the Forward Together moral movement took shape in response. People from all across North Carolina organized and mobilized to take back the state from extremists. The state NAACP, with its charismatic leader, Reverend William Barber II, built a movement from the ground up to challenge what they took to be an allout assault on the moral and social fabric of the state. The movement was not simply a reaction to Tea Party Republicans. "We started this when the Democrats were in power," Barber said. "We put out the word. The state had not complied with the Leandro decision [a 1994 publiceducation-equity lawsuit]. We still had not given public employees collective bargaining rights. We didn't have a racial justice act." But the actions of the North Carolina GOP intensified the group's efforts. More than 900 people who engaged in nonviolent civil disobedience to protest the Republican agenda were arrested during the 2013 legislative session. Reverend Barber put out a call across the country for a massive march in February to launch the 2014 Forward Together campaign. Eighty thousand to 100,000 people answered. It was the largest mass demonstration in the South since the Selma march in 1965. I arrived early. It was cold, and clouds blocked the sun as organizers began to set up. A few people worked on their signs. One sign read PROTECT ALL N.C. CITIZENS with different examples of vulnerable groups written underneath (the mentally ill, the unemployed, teachers, the elderly, students, prisoners, the uninsured, minorities). I was struck from the beginning by the cross-section of people there. Old and young, straight and gay, black, white, and Latino all began to gather. I asked a few of them why they were marching. Leslie Boyd, a white woman from Asheville, North Carolina, told me about her son, Michael Danforth. He had suffered from a birth defect that made it next to impossible for him to get health insurance. He died in the hospital, and ever since, she has dedicated her life to health care activism. She started a small nonprofit called Western North Carolina Health Advocates, through which she met Reverend Barber. He asked her to join the movement. The cold weather drove me into the nearby McDonald's, where several people sipped coffee while they waited for the march to begin. I struck up a conversation with Martin Marshall from Atlanta, Georgia, and Ron Gray from Rock Hill, South Carolina. Martin told me a story about his childhood experiences with racism, about the wall that divided his white community from the black community, and how racism was still alive today. "Voter restrictions and access to health care " were · the reasons he was marching. Ron was less talkative. He said, "I will give you the short form: injustice. I am here because it is the right place to be." Sitting next to Martin and Ron was an older white couple, Bill and Betsy Crittendon from Chapel Hill, North Carolina. They were members of an interracial choir called the United Voices of Praise. They had been involved in interracial social issues for a number of years and found the "regressive policies that have come about in this state [to be] just awful, absolutely awful. They have completely reversed the course of this state." Mrs. Crittendon wasn't too optimistic that the march would change the minds of state legislators, but she and her husband understood the long-term significance of the march and the Forward Together movement. "People need to see and hear what this is all about .... Every step along the way is a building step [to clear] the way for justice issues." These were people from different walks of life who understood the common ground of suffering in this country. For them, that understanding did not require anyone to leave the particulars of their suffering at the door. Anti-racism remained a part of their advocacy whether they struggled for universal health care or a living wage. They joined with others to urge a fundamental change in North Carolina and the country that could help break down racial habits. Reverend Barber thinks of their efforts in this way: [It's] about showing people the intersectionality of their lives; the intersectionality of their moving together . ... We have a phrase: we is the most important word in the justice vocabulary. The issue is not what I can do, but what we can do when we stand together, fight together, pray together, and work together, and we feel movement together. As I finished the conversations in McDonald's, I looked outside. Busload after busload of people had begun to arrive. Before the march began, speakers rallied the crowd. The topics were wide-ranging, from LGBT concerns, the state of public education, issues of immigration and the status of undocumented workers, to racist voter-ID laws. It was an in-the-flesh performance of a multiracial, multi-issue coalition. And whenever someone shouted, "Forward together," the crowd replied, "Not one step back." Initially, to an outsider looking in, the moment resembled the traditional theater of contemporary American protest. A march serves as a moment of catharsis. People gather, tensions are released, folks go back to business as usual, and the men (and it is typically always men) who lead the march leverage the spotlight for personal gain. But a brief glance beneath the surface of this particular gathering revealed something much more expansive. The march was just the tip of an organizing iceberg. Reverend Barber declared, "The Moral March inaugurates a fresh year of grassroots empowerment, voter education, litigation, and nonviolent direct action." In other words, this march wasn't a culmination but a catalyst: it dramatized an organizing effort (which preceded the gathering) that encompassed the courtroom, the ballot box, and the streets. For Barber, the work of democracy doesn't happen through marches or backroom deals but through concerted efforts "to change the context in which power operates." Of course, voting matters. But democracy is about the commitment to get one's hands dirty, and that work is often selfless and thankless. At the heart of those efforts is a more robust conception of government-a belief that government has the capacity to transform lives through focused legislation-and an insistence that we shift the center of moral gravity in North Carolina and in the nation. Five demands guide this insistence: (1) secure pro-labor, anti-poverty policies that ensure economic sustainability; (2) provide well-funded, quality public education to all; (3) stand up for the health of every North Carolinian by promoting health care access and environmental justice across all the state's communities; (4) address the continuing inequalities in the criminal justice system and ensure equality under the law for every person, regardless of race, class, creed, documentation, or sexual preference; and (5) protect and expand voting rights for people of color, immigrants, the elderly, and students to safeguard fair democratic representation. Each demand carries with it an expectation of the role of government in safeguarding the public good and an affirmation of the dignity and standing of all Americans. If we were to embrace these demands as policy, we would be well on our way to a revolution of value. As we marched from historic Shaw University, the place where the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee was founded in April 1960, to the state capitol, Americans from all walks of life expressed a radically egalitarian vision of this country. This vision did not require African Americans to leave their experiences at the door. Alongside demands for marriage equality, cries for support of public education, and calls for a more robust commitment to labor, marchers embraced the call for an anti-racist politics. As Reverend Barber said, "Some people wanted us to emphasize poverty instead of race. But you have to speak the truth. [Race] can be the Achilles' heel of the movement or lend itself to your moral positioning." We have to confront white supremacy, or what Barber calls "the corruption of the spirit and the conscience," as a fundamental contradiction of American democracy, or face the consequences of our silence. As the march concluded, I stood amazed at the power of ordinary people. Thousands of people had come together, for a moment, to declare their commitment to a radical vision of democracy. This is what has been missing in contemporary American politics. Reverend Barber's inspiring remarks struck a chord that reached back to the nineteenthcentury abolitionists, black and white, who decided to become traitors in the name of American democracy. They turned their backs on the slave regime. Barber called us to do the same with the political extremists of our times. We need the kind of language that's not left or right or conservative or liberal, but moral, fusion language that says look: it's extreme and immoral to suppress the right to vote. It's extreme and immoral to deny Medicaid for millions of poor people. . .. It's extreme and immoral to raise taxes on the working poor by cutting earned income taxes and to raise taxes on the poor and middle class in order to cut taxes for the wealthy. It's extreme and immoral to use power to cut off poor people's water in Detroit. That's immoral! What we need to cut off is that kind of abusive power! It's extreme and immoral to re-segregate our schools and underfund our public schools. It's extreme and immoral for people who came from immigrants to now have a mean amnesia and cry out against immigrants and the rights of children . ... That's not just bad policy, it's against the common good and a disregard for human rights. It's a refusal to lean toward the angels of our better selves . ... In policy and politics in America, we face two choices. One is the low road to political destruction, and the other is the pathway to higher ground. Barber finished speaking-preaching, really. The crowd joined hands to sing "We Shall Overcome." The voices were full of emotion and faith, not the sound of trepidation heard in the voices of those who sang the song after Reagan's speech in the Rose Garden. For much of the march, the day had been cloudy and cold. But as he spoke, the sun finally broke through. "The sun has come out," Reverend Barber started to shout. "The sun has come out. We are on our way to higher ground. Even the universe blesses this day. Even the universe says yes to justice, yes to equality, yes to higher ground." Marchers shouted. In front of me stood a white Episcopalian preacher in tears. I wiped my own eyes. This is the kind of social movement that will transform our idea of government. It insists on the dignity and standing of black people and other marginalized groups, and it argues for a dramatic change in what we as Americans care" most about. To be sure, the Forward Together moral movement isn't the only form of struggle we need. (In some ways, Reverend Barber represents the long-standing tradition of the charismatic preacher as leader, although he happens to be aware of the pitfalls of the model of leadership even as he exemplifies it.) It represents just one example of what a democratic awakening must do if we are to change the terms of political debate in this country: it must enact a different way of thinking about government and its relation to the most vulnerable among us.

### 1NC – PA Fiat

Private actor fiat is a voter – justifies fiat end racism and all companies stop being anticompetitive- makes it impossible to be neg, discourages mechanism education and testing because of competitive incnetives which turns education

Alt fails – no cx explanation of how they overcome broader institutions like the military, bureaucracies, and financial flows that all lock in whiteness

### 1NC – Violent Rev Fail

#### Violent revolutions fail and enhance state power

Flaherty 5. Andrew, <http://cryptogon.com/docs/pirate_insurgency.html>, USC researcher in political affairs, activist and organic farmer in New Zealand, ACS = American Corporate State

THE NATURE OF ARMED INSURGENCY AGAINST THE ACS Any violent insurgency against the ACS is sure to fail and will only serve to enhance the state's power. The major flaw of violent insurgencies, both cell based (Weathermen Underground, Black Panthers, Aryan Nations etc.) and leaderless (Earth Liberation Front, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, etc.) is that they are attempting to attack the system using the same tactics the ACS has already mastered: terror and psychological operations. The ACS attained primacy through the effective application of terror and psychological operations. Therefore, it has far more skill and experience in the use of these tactics than any upstart could ever hope to attain.4 This makes the ACS impervious to traditional insurgency tactics. - Political Activism and the ACS Counterinsurgency Apparatus The ACS employs a full time counterinsurgency infrastructure with resources that are unimaginableto most would be insurgents. Quite simply, violent insurgents have **no idea** of just how powerful the foe actually is. Violent insurgents typically start out as peaceful, idealistic, political activists. Whether or not political activists know it, even with very mundane levels of political activity, they are engaging in low intensity conflict with the ACS. The U.S. military classifies political activism as “low intensity conflict.” The scale of warfare (in terms of intensity) begins with individuals distributing anti-government handbills and public gatherings with anti-government/anti-corporate themes. In the middle of the conflict intensity scale are what the military refers to as Operations Other than War; an example would be the situation the U.S. is facing in Iraq. At the upper right hand side of the graph is global thermonuclear war. What is important to remember is that the military is concerned with ALL points along this scale because they represent different types of threats to the ACS. Making distinctions between civilian law enforcement and military forces, and foreign and domestic intelligence services is no longer necessary. After September 11, 2001, all national security assets would be brought to bear against any U.S. insurgency movement**.** Additionally, the U.S. military established NORTHCOM which designated the U.S. as an active military operational area. Crimes involving the loss of corporate profits will increasingly be treated as acts of terrorism and could garner anything from a local law enforcement response to activation of regular military forces. Most of what is commonly referred to as “political activism” is viewed by the corporate state's counterinsurgency apparatus as a useful and necessary component of political control. Letters-to-the-editor... Calls-to-elected-representatives... Waving banners... “Third” party political activities... Taking beatings, rubber bullets and tear gas from riot police in free speech zones... Political activism amounts to an utterly useless waste of time, in terms of tangible power, which is all the ACS understands. Political activism is a cruel guise that is sold to people who are dissatisfied, but who have no concept of the nature of tangible power. Counterinsurgency teams routinely monitor these activities, attend the meetings, join the groups and take on leadership roles in the organizations. It's only a matter of time before some individuals determine that political activism is a honeypot that accomplishes nothing and wastes their time. The corporate state knows that some small percentage of the peaceful, idealistic, political activists will eventually figure out the game. At this point, the clued-in activists will probably do one of two things; drop out or move to escalate the struggle in other ways. If the clued-in activist drops his or her political activities, the ACS wins. But what if the clued-in activist refuses to give up the struggle? Feeling powerless, desperation could set in and these individuals might become increasingly radicalized. Because the corporate state's counterinsurgency operatives have infiltrated most political activism groups, the radicalized members will be easily identified, monitored and eventually compromised/turned, arrested or executed. The ACS wins again.

### 1NC – Ruti

#### Subverting norms is worse – it presents a mirage of progress that conflates intellectual flattery with progressive politics and

Ruti 15 [Mari, professor of Critical Theory at the University of Toronto, *Between Levinas and Lacan: Self, Other, Ethics*, Bloomsbury Publishing, pg. 180-184]

In Chapter 2, I pointed out that Butler's attempt to have it both ways—to denounce the Enlightenment while simultaneously using its resources—leads to conceptual contradictions that cannot easily be resolved. The matter is worth revisiting here in greater detail because it highlights my major disagreement with Butler, namely that her wholesale vilification of autonomy reaches the kinds of hyperbolic ideological heights that cannot be theoretically defended. Indeed, it is in part the predictability of Butler's stance on this issue that explains why I have been so critical of her in this book: that I always know ahead of time how the argument is going to go—autonomy, sovereignty, rationality, normative limits bad; antinormativity, no matter how far-fetched, good—makes me feel the same way I do when I am grading yet another graduate student paper that undertakes the task of "deconstructing" the humanist subject. In the latter instance, it takes all the pedagogical willpower I can conjure up to not write in the margin, "Didn't we already do this circa 1975?" In Butler's case, I suppose I would like some explanation for why the monotonous disparagement of autonomy and related concepts is so important to her.

"This question is worth asking because the problematic of the subject—the question of the proper way to theorize the relationship between autonomy and subjection, agency and abjection, accountability and social determination—has been one of the most divisive issues of contemporary theory. I have already outlined my own position, which is that either-or solutions to this problematic are too one-dimensional, that if human beings are not entirely autonomous, they are not entirely subjected either, which is why we need to theorize both poles of the dichotomy simultaneously. This, refreshingly, is what Allen tries to do, which is one reason I have found her arguments so convincing. Allen explains that her goal "is to offer an analysis of power in all its depth and complexity, including an analysis of subjection that explicates how power works at the intrasubjective level to shape and constitute our very subjectivity, and an account of autonomy that captures the constituted subject's capacity for critical reflection and self-transformation, its capacity to be self-constituting" (PS 2-3). Without an account of subjection, Allen adds, critical theory cannot grasp "the real-world relations of power and subordination along lines of gender, race, and sexuality that it must illuminate if it is to be truly critical"; but without a satisfactory account of autonomy, critical theory "cannot envision possible paths of social transformation" {PS 3). This is why it is important to understand how we can be constituted by power yet capable of constituting ourselves, how we can be limited by our social context yet capable of critical reflection and self-transformation beyond this context.

Undoubtedly even our capacity for critical reflection and self-transformation is socially constituted, so that it would be possible to posit—with Zizek—that this capacity merely renders our subordination more livable. In Zizek's skeptical reading (and this is a possibility I touched on in Chapter 4), what the system wants is precisely that we rebel against it—that we strive for the kind of self transformation that gives us the illusion of being able to distance ourselves from it—because, in the final analysis, our attempts to defy its power merely consolidate this power; as Zizek maintains, in one of his more Foucaultian moments, power thrives on our action of disidentification because it "can reproduce itself only through some form of self-distance, by relying on the obscene disavowed rules and practices that are in conflict with its public norms."2 Yet it is also the case—as Zizek himself repeatedly stresses—that without the capacity for critical reflection and self-transformation our relationship to the big Other would be one of utter subjection.

### 1NC – AT: Endless War

No endless war – biden pulled out of the middle east

#### Conflicts have discernable causes and resolutions---specific proposals are key---removing intervention as a tool is worse

Michael **Singh 19**, M.B.A., Harvard University (Baker Scholar); B.A., Princeton University, Lane-Swig Senior Fellow and managing director at The Washington Institute and a former senior director for Middle East affairs at the National Security Council, 11/6/19, “Why the talk of ‘endless wars’ misses the mark”, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/11/06/why-talk-endless-wars-misses-mark/

It’s a notion that is difficult to resist — who exactly is for “endless war,” after all? — and rooted in deep public frustration with the costly but seemingly fruitless interventions of the post-9/11 era. But as a guide to **policymaking**, opposition to **“forever wars”** is not useful. Such terms conflate three separate concerns, each of which demands separate consideration.

First and most fundamentally, opposition to “endless wars” reflects skepticism regarding the deployment of U.S. military forces overseas, and of intervention as a policy tool. According to the Defense Department, there are about 200,000 U.S. service members deployed overseas in nearly 170 different countries or territories — a remarkable number given that there are just 195 countries in the world.

Yet the differences among the United States’ various military missions are stark, and each deserves **independent scrutiny rather than blanket opposition** or, for that matter, knee-jerk support. It should be obvious that the 55,000 U.S. troops in Japan are engaged in different work than our 5,200 or so service members in Iraq. Less well-recognized, however, is how much even one combat mission in the Middle East differs from another.

At its height, the Iraq War involved almost 160,000 U.S. soldiers. The U.S. military mission in Syria, on the other hand, has involved roughly 2,000 soldiers who have rallied a local partner force 70,000-strong, enabled a coalition air campaign, and provided a platform for civilian stabilization activities. It was an altogether more economical deployment, and perhaps even a model for future interventions. Yet both President Trump and his critics have lumped Syria in with Iraq and Afghanistan as another example of “endless war.”

The second concern covered by the term “endless war” is the seeming overemphasis on the broader Middle East in U.S. foreign policy in recent decades; critics use the term to inveigh against involvement in Syria or Afghanistan far more often, than say, Somalia. As we engage in what seems an inevitable shift away from the Middle East, however, we will find that the real problem is less the prioritization of the Middle East than the heavily military focus of U.S. policy there.

External intervention in the region clearly hasn’t always promoted stability — just see post-2003 Iraq. And major wars aren’t the only problem. The United States also sends the lion’s share of our global security assistance — training and equipment — to the Middle East. Yet as events of the past several years attest, these programs have an underwhelming record of delivering security.

On their own, military intervention and security assistance can’t solve the deeper problems that drive conflict, such as stagnant economies or repressive political systems. Nor have they stemmed the growth of violent extremism, which has seen a manifold increase since the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. Yet, ironically, even as we have grown weary of intervening, we have also decreased our commitment to promoting economic reform and political liberalization, or to the diplomatic leadership required to prevent conflicts or resolve them short of war.

Finally, worries about “endless war” often stem from a mismatch between stated U.S. objectives and the means we are willing to use to achieve them. This has been a bipartisan malady, and the causes are complex. Our immense military and economic advantages lead us to set unrealistic goals, and the impatience of our politics sometimes leads us to withdraw support even from achievable missions

Syria provides examples of both fallacies. One can fault President Barack Obama, who insisted that “Assad must go” but failed to devise a strategy that could come close to delivering such an outcome. But one can also fault Trump, who refused to spend even the funds that Congress appropriated for stabilization in northeastern Syria and who has reduced a successful 2,000-troop mission to one consisting of several hundred — apparently without scaling back its objectives.

There is no catch-all approach that will end the “endless wars.” One thing we clearly shouldn’t do, however, is to renounce military intervention as a policy tool. The use or the threat of military action has often been a force for **peace and stability** — see, for example, Cold War deployments to Europe, or the NATO mission in the Balkans during the 1990s. If we reduce interventions by ignoring problems around the world, our solace will be temporary as small, far-off crises grow into large, unavoidable ones.

The real antidote to “endless war” is more **disciplined policymaking**. The United States needs to adopt strategies that will reduce the need for interventions, reinvigorating our use of tools like diplomacy, deterrence, and economic statecraft. And when intervention becomes necessary — which it inevitably will — we should use force economically and with clear, realistic aims in mind. A less engaged **U**nited **S**tates benefits neither the world nor ourselves; a **U**nited **S**tates energetically committed to policies designed to prevent conflict will advance not only our own interests, but those of humanity writ large.

## 2NC Cards

#### Demands on the state don’t reaffirm its legitimacy

Newman 10 (Saul, Reader in Political Theory at Goldsmiths, U of London, Theory & Event Volume 13, Issue 2)

There are two aspects that I would like to address here. Firstly, the notion of demand: making certain demands on the state – say for higher wages, equal rights for excluded groups, to not go to war, or an end to draconian policing – is one of the basic strategies of social movements and radical groups. Making such demands does not necessarily mean working within the state or reaffirming its legitimacy. On the contrary, demands are made from a position outside the political order, and they often exceed the question of the implementation of this or that specific measure. They implicitly call into question the legitimacy and even the sovereignty of the state by highlighting fundamental inconsistencies between, for instance, a formal constitutional order which guarantees certain rights and equalities, and state practices which in reality violate and deny them.

#### Debate does not change the fundamental values of its participants, but it does trend them away from over-reliance on their initial, unvetted gut reactions to symbolic politics in favor of more complex, deep understandings of issues – that takes out their link turn and magnifies the link

Niemeyer 11 [Simon Niemeyer, Centre for Deliberative Global Governance, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University. The Emancipatory Effect of Deliberation: Empirical Lessons from Mini-Publics. 2011. https://unige.ch/sciences-societe/socio/files/2114/0533/6108/002.pdf]

The results of the two case studies in this article suggest that deliberation does not fundamentally change individuals or inculcate a sense of moral duty. The particular values that prevailed in both issues were always present (and measurable), even if they were latent in expressed preferences. Before deliberation, most participants believed they were acting in the public interest,69 but good intentions alone are not sufficient to formulate civic-minded preferences. Predeliberative preferences were more strongly influenced by discourses associated with symbolic politics. Following deliberation, symbolic cues reduced the “cost” of arriving at a decision,70 but the cognitive shortcut resulted in positions that did not properly reflect participants’ overall subjectivity.

Before deliberation, symbolic politics—or at least the mere presence of potent symbols—distorted participants’ preferences. This process may be manipulative and overt, as in the case of the Bloomfield Track, or incidental, as in the case of the Fremantle Bridge. Deliberation successfully corrected the influence of symbolic politics because it provided both the incentive and the means to develop positions on an intersubjective set of recognized issues that extended beyond the narrow set of unhelpful symbolic ones. The mechanism whereby this occurred did not so much involve changing incentive structures, as predicted by institutional rational choice.71 Rather, it changed the decision pathway from a casual understanding of emotionally appealing content to a deeper understanding that allowed participants to better express their own subjectivity. The change was as much a function of stripping away the impact of symbolic arguments as it was due to participants’ increased ability and willingness to deal with issue complexity. This suggests that the transformative effect might be more easily replicated in the wider public sphere than is ordinarily supposed.

#### Should implies fiat

OED No Date

[Oxford English Dictionary, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/should]

MODAL VERB should 1Used to indicate obligation, duty, or correctness, typically when criticizing someone's actions. ‘he should have been careful’ More example sentences Synonyms 1.1Indicating a desirable or expected state. ‘by now students should be able to read with a large degree of independence’ More example sentencesSynonyms 1.2Used to give or ask advice or suggestions. ‘you should go back to bed’ More example sentences 1.3I shouldUsed to give advice. ‘I should hold out if I were you’ More example sentences 2Used to indicate what is probable. ‘$348 million should be enough to buy him out’ More example sentences 3formal (expressing the conditional mood) referring to a possible event or situation. ‘if you should change your mind, I'll be at the hotel’

#### ‘Expand’ means to make greater, not clarify its current state by applying it differently

Terry J. Hatter 90 Jr., United States District Judge, California Central District, In re Eastport Assoc., 114 B.R. 686, 690, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6308, \*10-11 (C.D. Cal. March 20, 1990), 3/20/1990, Lexis

Second, Eastport asserts that the presumption against retroactivity does not apply because the amendment was intended only as a clarification of existing law. HN7 Where an amendment to a statute is remedial in nature and merely serves to clarify existing law, no question of retroactivity is involved and the law will be applied to pending cases. City of Redlands v. Sorensen, 176 Cal. App. 3d 202, 211, 221 Cal. Rptr. 728, 732 (1985). The evidence in this case, however, does not support the conclusion that the amendment to section 66452.6(f) was simply a clarification of preexisting law. The Legislative Counsel's Digest specifically states that "the bill would *expand* the definition of development moratorium." Senate Bill 186, Stats. 1988, ch. 1330, at 3375 (emphasis added). Since the Legislative Counsel is a state official required by law to analyze pending legislation, it is reasonable to presume that the Legislature amended the statute with the intent and meaning expressed in the Counsel's digest. People v. Martinez, 194 Cal. App. 3d 15, 22, 239 Cal. Rptr. 272, 276 (1987). By its ordinary meaning, the term "expand" indicates a change in the law, rather than a restatement of existing [\*\*11] law. In light of the Counsel's comment, Eastport's argument is unpersuasive.

**Antitrust specifically allows for creativity in new goals – it isn’t wedded to one form of economics which solves all the 1AC Pitts monolingualism stuff that’s about liberalism generally**

Zephyr **Teachout**, associate professor of law at Fordham with an amazing name, February **2020** 41 Cardozo L. Rev. 3 http://cardozolawreview.com/antitrust-law-freedom-and-human-development

Because the scope of existing and potential antitrust law is broad—it includes a huge range of rules shaping market structures and power—the range of potential goals **could be infinite**. Nothing in antitrust precludes any possible goals. Despite this, an enormous amount of debate presumes that we need historical support to argue for particular goals. Unlike, say, rent regulation, where we understand that the goals of housing policy should be driven by the needs of the moment, there is no similar recognition that antitrust is fundamentally legislative, and therefore designed to be responsive to the needs of the moment. Although I also turn to history in this Paper, and rely on thinkers of the last few centuries, we are not constrained by history in considering what the goals of antimonopoly laws might be. Antitrust is not, as it were, constitutional, even as it is constitutive. We could conclude that new goals, invented out of whole cloth, are the appropriate goals: were we to do so, we would then push for passing new laws to implement those purposes. Nothing in existing antitrust and antimonopoly laws themselves limits the goals to a singular purpose, or solely economic purposes.

The TVA solves the selfhood argument – it is based on a changed understanding of people’s engagement with race which is what they said in CX, so that’s based on the evidence and arguments read to change the assumption, not the plan, which is a provisional statement that doesn’t preclude understanding the impact of the aff through differing lenses

## 1NR Cards

### cards

#### Growth solves better.

Tejvan **Pettinger 19**. Economic teacher and graduate with a degree from Oxford University. "Benefits of economic growth." Economics Help. 12-14-2019. <https://www.economicshelp.org/macroeconomics/economic-growth/benefits-growth/>

Economic growth means an increase in real GDP – an increase in the value of national output, income and expenditure. Essentially the benefit of economic growth is **higher living standards** – higher real incomes and the ability to devote more resources to areas like health care and education.

[Chart Omitted]

real-gdp-1955

UK real GDP since 1955. Shows the magnitude of increased national output.

The benefits of economic growth include

benefits-growth

**Higher average incomes**. Economic growth enables consumers to consume more goods and services and enjoy better standards of living. Economic growth during the Twentieth Century was a major factor in reducing absolute levels of poverty and enabling a rise in life expectancy.

**Lower unemployment**. With higher output and positive economic growth, firms tend to **employ more workers** creating more employment.

[Chart Omitted]

unemployment-total

UK unemployment rises during a recession – falls during periods of economic growth.

Lower government borrowing. Economic growth creates higher tax revenues, and there is less need to spend money on benefits such as unemployment benefit. Therefore economic growth helps to reduce government borrowing. Economic growth also plays a role in reducing debt to GDP ratios.

[Chart Omitted]

uk-national-debt

A long period of economic growth in the post-war period helped reduce the UK debt to GDP ratio.

**Improved public services**. Higher economic growth leads to higher tax revenues and this enables the government can spend more on public services, such as health care and education e.t.c. **This can enable higher living standards, such as increased life expectancy, higher rates of literacy and a greater understanding of civic and political issues.**

Money can be spent on protecting the environment. With higher economic growth a society can devote more resources to promoting recycling and the use of renewable resources

Investment. Economic growth encourages firms to invest, in order to meet future demand. Higher investment increases the scope for future economic growth – creating a virtuous cycle of economic growth/investment.

**Increased research and development.** High economic growth leads to increased profitability for firms, enabling more spending on research and development. Also, sustained economic growth increases confidence and encourages firms to take risks and innovate.

Economic development. The biggest factor for promoting economic development is sustained economic growth. Economic growth in south-east Asia over the past few decades has played a major role in reducing absolute levels of poverty – increasing life expectancy.

More choice. In less developed economies, a large proportion of the population work in agriculture/subsistence farming, **economic growth enables a more diverse economy with people able to work in service sector, manufacturing and having a greater choice of lifestyles.**

#### Objective data shows capitalism creates better overall standards of living than the alternatives

Alexander **Hammond** Nov 6 **2019** [Free Trade Fellow and Director of the Initiative for African Trade and Prosperity “Anti-capitalism: trendy but wrong” Institute of Economic Affairs <https://iea.org.uk/anti-capitalism-trendy-but-wrong/>]

Last night, thousands of anti-capitalist protestors took to the streets in capital cities across the world. Wearing V for Vendetta-inspired Guy Fawkes masks (most of which are made in China), these self-styled “anti-establishment” demonstrators, who took part in annual Million Mask March, sought to express their dissatisfaction with the capitalist system and the unfair outcomes it allegedly creates. Large anti-capitalist protests like those we saw last night are, of course, nothing unusual. In August, French police resorted to using water cannons and tear gas to disperse thousands of anti-capitalist demonstrators who were protesting in the French coastal town of Bayonne, during the G7 summit which was taking place in a nearby resort.

But it is not just during protests that we see disdain for capitalism. All over our newspapers there are headlines such as, “Capitalism is in crisis,” “Capitalism is failing,” or most recently “Capitalism is dead,” – the latter being a recent quote from billionaire Salesforce CEO, Marc Benioff, who amassed his fortune thanks to the capitalist system.

The consistent bombardment of capitalism in our media and on our streets has culminated in a recent YouGov poll showing that nearly half of all Millennials and Gen-Z’ers hold an unfavourable view of capitalism. The same poll also found that more than 70 percent of Millennials would likely vote for a socialist candidate.

It is fundamentally trendy to be socialist, and to decry the alleged ills of capitalism. But does this persistent condemnation of capitalism hold up to scrutiny?

Every year, the Fraser Institute, a Canadian think tank publishes its Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) report in order to find out which countries have the freest (i.e. most capitalist) economies. The EFW ranks the level of freedom of 162 economies, using 43 indices, across major policy areas: size of government, legal systems and property rights, sound money, freedom to trade internationally, and regulation.

The idea behind the EFW report is that if you can find out which countries have the most capitalist economies, you can then use this information to see if more capitalist countries have better outcomes for their citizens when compared to their more socialist (or at least: less capitalist) counterparts. To analyse the correlation between economic freedom and human wellbeing, the EFW splits the 162 economies into quartiles, based on their level of economic freedom. And the results are staggering.

The average income in the most capitalist quartile of countries is an astonishing 6 times higher, in real terms, than the average income in the least capitalist economies ($36,770 and $6,140 respectively). For the poorest in society, this gap widens even more. The bottom 10 percent of income earners in the most capitalist countries make, on average, 7 times more than the poorest 10 percent in the least free economies. Similarly, more than 27 percent of people in the most socialist economies live in extreme poverty (as defined by the World Bank as an income of less than $1.90 a day), whereas just 1.8 percent of people in freest economies live in extreme poverty – a figure that is still too high (the optimal number is zero), but vastly better than the level that persists in the least free countries.

Economic measures aside, people living in the most capitalist countries also **live on average 14 years longer,** have an **infant mortality rate 6 times lower**, enjoy greater political and civil liberties, gender equality, and to the extent you can measure such things, greater happiness too – when compared to the least capitalist economies.

Take Hong Kong, for example, which is the world’s freest economy according the EFW report. In 1941, journalist and travel writer Martha Gellhorn visited the city-state with her husband, Ernest Hemmingway and noted “the real Hong Kong…was the most cruel poverty, worse than any I had seen before. Worse still because of an air of eternity; life had always been like this, always would be.” But just a few years after Gellhorn’s visit, the surrender of the Japanese in 1945 meant that British rule returned to the island and with it came a largely laissez-faire approach to the city’s economy.

In 1950, the average citizen in Hong Kong earned just 36 percent of what the average citizen in the United Kingdom earned. But as Hong Kong embraced economic freedom (according the EFW, Hong Kong has had the most capitalist economy every year bar one since 1970), it became substantially richer. Today, Hong Kong’s GDP per capita is a whooping than 68 percent higher than the UK’s. As Marian Tupy, editor of HumanProgress.org, notes, “the poverty that Gellhorn bemoaned is gone – thanks to economic freedom.”

We can see **far bigger gaps** whenever we pair a broadly capitalist country with an otherwise similar socialist country: Chile vs Venezuela, West Germany vs East Germany, South Korea vs North Korea, Taiwan vs Maoist China, Costa Rica vs Cuba, and so on. (Yes, I know: none of that was ‘real’ socialism. But then, it always is real socialism, until it isn’t.)

Decrying the ills of capitalism on a placard or in a newspaper headline is a trend with little sign of going away any time soon, but when we see such unsubstantiated claims, we should remember; the **data simply doesn’t support the anti-capitalists**.

#### Language isn’t deterministic – other factors determine decisions

**Shim 14**[David Shim is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations and International Organization of the University of Groningen. “Visual Politics and North Korea: Seeing is believing.”]

Imagery can enact powerful effects, since political actors are almost always pressed to take action when confronted with images of atrocity and human suffering resultant from wars, famines and natural disasters. Usually, humanitarian emergencies are conveyed through media representations, which indicate the important role of images in producing emergency situations as (global) events (Benthall 1993; **Campbell 2003b**; Lisle 2009; Moeller 1999; Postman 1987). Debbie Lisle (2009: 148) maintains that, 'we see that the objects, issues and events we usually study [. . .] do not even exist without the media [.. .] to express them’. As a consequence, visual images have political and ethical consequences as a result of their role in shaping private and public ways of seeing (Bleiker. Kay 2007). This is because how people come to know, think about and respond to developments in the world is deeply entangled with how these developments are made visible to them.

Visual representations participate in the processes of how people situate themselves in space and time, because seeing involves accumulating and ordering information in order to be able to construct knowledge of people, places and events. For example, the remembrance of such events as the Vietnam War, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 or the torture in Abu Ghraib prison cannot be separated from the ways in which these events have been represented in films, TV and photography (Bleiker 2009; Campbell/Shapiro 2007; Moller2007). The visibility of these events can help to set the conditions for specific forms of political action. The current war in Afghanistan serves as an example of this. Another is the nexus of hunger images and relief operations. Vision and visuality thus become part and parcel of political dynamics, also revealing the ethical dimension of imagery, as it affects the ways in which people interact with each other.

However, **particular** representations do not automatically lead to **particular**responses as, for instance, proponents of the so-called 'CNN effect’ would argue (for an overview of the debates among academic, media and policy-making circles on the 'CNN effect', see Gilboa 2005; see also. Dauber 2001; Eisensee/ Stromberg 2007; Livingston/Eachus 1995; O'Loughlin 2010; Perlmutter 1998, 2005; Robinson 1999, 20011. There is **no causal relationship** between a specific image and a political **intervention**, in which a dependent variable (the image) would explain the outcome of an independent one (the act). David Perlmutter (1998: I), for instance, explicitly challenges, as he calls it, the **'visual determinism' of images,** which dominates political and public opinion. Referring to findings based on public surveys, he argues that the formation of opinions by individuals depends **not on images** but on their idiosyncratic predispositions and values (see also, Domke et al. 2002; Perlmutter 2005).

Yet, it should also be noted that visuals function as unquestioned **referents** in international politics when underlining the **necessity** of such **specific policy practices** as sanctions, deterrents and/or military cooperation. A good example of this is satellite imagery, which plays a pivotal role in the surveillance and assessment of missile or nuclear proliferation activities by so-called ‘rogue states’ like Iran and North Korea. Regarded as providing compelling evidence about the stage of development of nuclear facilities or about the collaboration between suspect states, satellite images point to a nexus between visuality, knowledge and international politics wherein this way of seeing consequently enables governments to make legitimate statements, draw conclusions and take informed political action. In sum, the visual provides the foundation for knowledge generation and, in doing so, bestows political responses with legitimacy (cf. Möller 2007). A now famous case-in-point is Colin Powell’s PowerPoint presentation at the United Nations Security Council in February 2003. In the briefing, the then US Secretary of State showed satellite images that allegedly proved the existence of Iraqi ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’. What was remarkable about Powell’s presentation was that the visual emerged as the primary referent for the US government’s casus belli, which, in the words of MacDonald et al. (2010: 7–8), disclosed the fact that the ‘logic of geopolitical reason is now inseparable from its visual representation’ (see also, Campbell 2007c; Der Derian 2001).

The **causal theory of the ‘CNN effect’**, or what Perlmutter (1998: 1) has called above ‘visual determinism’, **misconceives** of how the visual **recasts the political** realm itself (Hansen 2011). Rather than asking whether an **image caused an intervention**, it should be **ask**ed instead how the visual has been involved in structuring the understandings of legitimate action, and how visual representations of different policy options affect particular **security practices** (Williams 2003: 527). For instance, many scholars have shown that images can provoke particularly emotive responses (Bleiker/Hutchison 2008; Crawford 2000; Hariman/Lucaites 2007; Mercer 2006; Ross 2006). Just one example of the (deliberate) evocation of an emotional reaction is the numerous fundraising campaigns that have been run by different humanitarian aid organizations over the years, in which imagery plays an essential role (Bell/Carens 2004; Dogra 2007; Manzo 2008).